«European Israel,» decline of the West and permanent war in Ukraine

Brian Bonner: Hello, everybody. This is Brian Bonner again, host of Ukraine Calling at Hromadske Radio’s beautiful studio in downtown Kyiv. Ukraine’s war against Russia is being fought on many fronts, and the most critical, of course, is the soldiers on the front line.

But there’s also a diplomatic war, or diplomacy is a part of the war, and it needs its soldiers. They are Ukraine’s ambassadors and diplomatic corps, working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Today, I am honored to have one of our top diplomats since 1995, Olexander Scherba. Welcome to the studio.

Olexander Scherba: Thank you for having me.

Brian Bonner: Olexander is Ukraine’s ambassador-at-large and is in charge of strategic communications. He was a longtime ambassador to Austria from 2014 to 2021. Before that, he served in Germany and, I believe, Washington as well. He’s fluent in Ukrainian, Russian, German, and English. He has a Twitter following that would love to have – 264,000 followers who tune in to his, I think, must-read updates and take on today’s changing situation.

He is also the author of “Ukraine vs. Darkness: Undiplomatic Thoughts,” published in 2021. I’m embarrassed, but I hadn’t read it until two days ago when I knew you were coming to the program. I decided I had to read it because it’s too embarrassing to interview somebody who’s written a book and has not read it. But I enjoyed it. It’s a fantastic book, and I am sure we’ll get into that conversation.

Olexander Scherba: Thank you. You are one of not many people who read it. I’m glad you enjoyed it.

What does it take to be a good diplomat?

Brian Bonner: Well, you know, you can just reprint a page on your Twitter feed, and you’ll have 265,000 readers, making you a bestseller. But he’s a great writer, and I recommend this book to everybody because it takes us through until 2021, the year before the full-scale invasion. You’ve been at this since 1995. What have you learned since then about what it takes to be a good diplomat and not a good diplomat?

Olexander Scherba: First of all, I learned that 99% of cliches and stereotypes about these professions and these mean jokes about them have absolutely nothing to do with the real profession. Most importantly, the joke about that diplomat’s tongue serves the purpose of covering and hiding his thoughts.

I always liked how Harold Nicholson, a very interesting British diplomat in the 1930s who wrote a book called Diplomacy, viewed diplomacy. Part of this book is about what it takes to be a good diplomat. And the number one thing on that list of what a diplomat should have is truthfulness. I was amazed by that. Ever since, I have just thought about it, contemplated that, and realized how right he was.

What is the current state of support for Ukraine in the world?

Brian Bonner: Well, yes, truth has been a short commodity from the Russian side, but that brings us to how the war is going. How is the diplomatic war going? Because as you know, Russia is sparing no expense to sow division and disinformation around the world. Where are we doing well, and where could things be better?

Olexander Scherba: Well, it’s a mixed bag. On the one hand, of course, it’s amazing how unanimously, or at least almost unanimously, in the West, the Western political community, the governments, and, for the most part, the societies support Ukraine. Sometimes, I felt that many countries of the world, especially those involved in World War II, had these historical flashbacks in their minds right away.

I mean, Poland, for obvious reasons, and the United Kingdom remembered the Blitz. Germany and Austria remembered what it felt like to be in ruins—the whole of Europe. So it is on the positive side. It’s not only political impulse; it’s also emotional and historical, and it makes the West our ally.

On the negative side and minor side is what I see on social media and Twitter. Sometimes, you feel that the tides have turned, and suddenly, the world isn’t with us anymore, and the battle for hearts and minds is being lost. Then, you look at the sociological surveys in Western countries and realize they are not reality. 70% of the societies are still with Ukraine. But unfortunately, due to the efforts of Mr. Elon Musk and Tucker Carlson and etcetera, etcetera…

Brian Bonner: Marjorie Taylor Greene.

Olexander Scherba: Yeah, we have this kind of situation where in social media, in this dimension, we aren’t as successful as we wish we would be.

What is the role of diplomacy during the war?

Brian Bonner: Is it fair to say diplomacy at war boils down to three things: securing allies, countering disinformation from Russia and enemies, and convincing allies to give Ukraine the weapons it needs?

Olexander Scherba: Absolutely, very well put. Countering Russian disinformation was a very, very difficult job, which led to securing help for Ukraine. So, numbers two and three are very connected.

Brian Bonner: I’m interested in what you learned about the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and our diplomatic corps during the war. One lesson everybody learned was that we have some weak spots in the Global South, particularly Africa and parts of Asia and Latin America, that didn’t want to support us. They wanted to stay out of it and still want to stay out of it. I read the other day that we’re going to open embassies in several African countries, maybe elsewhere. What’s behind this push?

Olexander Scherba: The West has overslept the decline of its reputation in the Global South. It’s not only in the Global South. Quite frankly, in countries like Austria, I cannot describe to you how many times my conversations that started as a conversation about the Ukraine-Russia war and how terrible Russia is and in the 5th or 10th minute became: “But what about those Americans?” Even Austrians were bad-mouthing America.

Throughout the world, America and imperialism have become synonymous, which is unfair. It is partially fair, but for the most part, not. And America, the West, has overslept it. I once spoke to a very good South African journalist who was amazed by Ukraine and who loved Ukraine. Still, he said: “Please, for God’s sake, don’t mention that you’re fighting for European values because, for us, European values are colonizer values and imperialist values.”

So we, and by “we,” I mean the West, the collective West, and I don’t think it’s negative to say “collective West.” The more collective we get, the better, and in particular, Ukraine, of course. We have to amend the situation, although it will be a long uphill fight.

Brian Bonner: Is it a smart idea to open embassies? How many countries do we have embassies in?

Olexander Scherba: We have diplomatic missions, 50-something, not counting the missions where the ambassadors are basically in charge but are stationed elsewhere; 54, 58.

Brian Bonner: There are 190 nations in the world. Just like the war frontline is more than 1,000 kilometers, the diplomatic front lines are all over the globe. Is the ministry getting enough talent and money to field more embassies worldwide? Is it doing okay budget-wise?

Olexander Scherba: It’s spread very thin, of course. But I look at American and French diplomacy, for instance, the countries that are represented in all of the countries and are even facing problems. Even their reputation and interests are under attack in African countries and many countries of the Global South.

So, first of all, we should open these embassies. We are making up for all the time Ukrainian diplomacy lost on that front. But it will be a very, very long fight. And yes, it depends on the talent. I see this interest in young diplomats or even people from outside the system who have been invited and want to work in those difficult countries. It will be useful. But again, our expectations and enthusiasm shouldn’t get out of control here.

Brian Bonner: If you’re talking to Brussels, you position yourself in the West, Western values, and in the United States, you position yourself the same way. But then, do you have to position yourself differently with the Global South, India, and South Africa? I mean, maybe as a victim of an aggressor, or what approach works the best?

Olexander Scherba: I spent most of my career as a speechwriter before becoming an ambassador. And so my job was finding the right words, I was always a person who was very good at speaking. And it’s very natural that in a space that is very different from the West, even in the Western countries, you should pick your words differently in every country. But as I said, all of a sudden, European values, something so positive, something loaded with enthusiasm here in Ukraine, all of a sudden I just discovered that for some countries in Africa, it’s absolutely negative. So, yeah, we have to act there differently.

I was absolutely out of the blue invited to a very interesting conference in India in February. It was coincidentally on February 24, and everybody was talking about Ukraine. I was addressing this very skeptical audience, and I said, you know what, you have been the crown jewel of your empire. We have been the crown jewel of our empire. Your empire came to its senses and withdrew. The empire to which we belonged went batshit crazy. So please be more sympathetic and talk less about walking the same line between good and evil but picking the side of good.

I was surprised; people started applauding. So, those are the kinds of words that would work, for instance, in India. Every country should be respected. But it’s not like we are bringing a new version, a different version of Ukraine, to every country. We just find a different way to explain the same truth.

Brian Bonner: Early in the war, Kenya’s representative to the United Nations struck me, I wish I could cite his name. He said: “In Africa since the colonialists drew our boundaries, if we wanted to continue fighting over boundaries, we would have endless war.” Well, they almost do now in many nations. And so the time has come to say, whatever your internationally recognized boundary is, like Ukraine’s, that’s it. I think that’s very persuasive; it’s a good effort.

Olexander Scherba: Absolutely. And, you know, they have an even better situation in Europe, where the national borders in many situations are not relevant anymore. And it’s one of the things that makes this whole war insane for Europeans. Once you live in a reality where you don’t respect the same values and play by the same rules, it makes sense to claim these historical territories. ‘We will take it back like the Russians do.’ This is 19th-century thinking and not the 21st century. 21st century in Austria, you drive on the road, and on the right side of the road, it’s Austria, and on the left side is Slovenia. And nobody gives a damn about it.

The different paths of Ukraine and Russia

Brian Bonner: You write insightfully in your book. That reminds me of a passage where you said Russia and Ukraine, with all the centuries of proximity and relations, answered the question about the future differently. Ukraine one way and Russia the other. Can you explain that?

Olexander Scherba: That’s why these two nations that have been so similar in the beginning of their way, and that would be the moment of the Soviet Union falling apart, became so different. Because one nation was looking for a future in its past. That would be Russia. And the other one was looking for the future, where the future should be – ahead of it.

Two nations were not happy with what they had. One nation: “It’s all America’s fault, the West’s fault, and now we split with the West, we deny it and reject it, and things will improve for us.” And for Ukraine, the Ukrainians said: “It’s our fault.” We made bad choices in the past and are so imperfect in so many ways. We want to improve, and we want to improve in the same way Poland did, and the Czech Republic did because we saw how it works.

So these are the two paths these two nations took, which were indeed, in the beginning, rather similar, but we see now that they are eons away from each other.

Brian Bonner: You’re a Ukrainian who is much younger than me, more than 10 years younger than me, but you grew up in the Soviet Union, basically until your 20s. You’re 53 now, and your professional life and education were post-independent. Is this break irreversible? We’re never going back? Back to the Russian-Soviet mentality, the closed society mentality.

Olexander Scherba: I cannot imagine. I had a friend, a politician with whom I had this talk, and he said: “You know what, there is this Croatian or Serbian study that proves that no matter how hot and passionate hate is, it doesn’t live longer than 15 years.” For some reason, somehow, they figured it out in exactly 15 years. And after 15 years, you know, it’s smoother, and people don’t care as much as they did in the beginning when this erupted, this negative feeling.

But quite frankly, for me, it’s unthinkable. I cannot imagine after what has been done after people getting killed, raped, beheaded, and castrated. There was one person in Kyiv Oblast who was skinned alive. After this, going back to what was between Ukraine and Russia is unthinkable.

Brian Bonner: So, even after the fighting, no reconciliation with Russia?

Olexander Scherba: Well, living next to each other is inevitable. But all the positive things that connected these two nations, you know, my mother-in-law is ethnic Russian. She grew up in Russia until she was 17 and came to Ukraine. So, she is a very passionate Ukrainian citizen. Originally, she is from Kursk Oblast, a small town called Glushkovo, founded by Ukrainian Cossacks in the distant past.

I showed her how this town and this part of Russia was sending off Russian soldiers to fight against Ukraine with music, with enthusiasm, with everything, she cried. I don’t know how you get over this. It wouldn’t be possible for her to look at Russia the same way, although originally she is from there.

Reordering Ukrainian society along military lines

Brian Bonner: In your book, you said it would take generations even before the full-scale war. But then, unless there’s a big sea change in imperial thinking and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s and his successor’s thinking. Aren’t we going to be forever in what Zelensky said, the big Israel perpetually at war? And don’t we need to reorder society along those lines? And where are we in a restructuring society?

Olexander Scherba: Well, after this war, we will have a lot in common with Israel in the way that we should be very much aware that there is an enemy right next to us. I’m not an expert on Russia, and I’ve been wrong about Russia more often than I was right, but I liked what Vladislav Surkov once wrote about Putin’s system very much. The strength of Putin’s empire lies in the deep unconditional trust between “the deep people.” What he calls “the deep people” – people outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg and the supreme leader.

And it’s not any supreme leader, but this particular supreme leader. So, once this supreme leader is gone, I hope that this evil system in Russia will start to crumble one way or another. Unfortunately, as long as Putin is in charge of Russia, which means until he is alive, we will have a very tough time.

Brian Bonner: Here’s a diplomatic challenge, you have many of them. I mean, justifiably, Ukraine wants everything from the West. I agree that the West should give Ukraine all the money and weapons it needs to win. And that should be the strategic objective – victory, not just holding their own.

However, incumbent on that is that Ukrainians also do everything they can to win. And that’s come under fire a little bit by politicians and diplomats in the West who say, hey, you need to field more soldiers. You need to lower your draft age. You must also show that you’re doing everything in the fight. Do they have a point?

Olexander Scherba: Yeah, absolutely, I think so. I have a friend who left his comfortable life in Austria. He had a very comfy job with a posh salary. He left everything to fight in the Donbas, a Ukrainian from Bila Tserkva. And I meet with him regularly, not as often as I wish, because he’s fighting, but we meet every time he has a possibility and is in Kyiv. Quite frankly, I see this sadness in his eyes and his attitude when he, who gives everything for Ukraine to survive and to win in this war, when he looks at people walking by and having their usual lives.

It’s not okay. We in Ukraine need to wake up and realize that everybody should contribute much, much more. We all owe these soldiers. We all need to be, in one way or another, these soldiers. It’s happening in the country, but not as fast as it should be happening.

Brian Bonner: Sweden hasn’t fought a war since 1860. I believe they have this thing called “all-society defense.” It comes to the nation’s defense from 18 to 70 years old, which would include me if I was Swedish. It doesn’t mean they’re at the front line; it means they are in obligatory service of some kind. And I can see where we could use that at the front now because they’re furiously digging, the soldiers are trying to fight and dig defensive trenches. Is that the kind of service you see? Israel takes people from 18, and Russia takes people from 18.

Olexander Scherba: I don’t know how it will be after the war. Probably, there will be obligatory military service. And probably, it will not be like in my case where I studied a certain military profession at the university, which was the translator from Russian into German in Ukraine, strangely enough. And then, for 30 years, I wasn’t called into the army to somehow update my skills and knowledge.

It shouldn’t be that way. First of all, men should be called into the army regularly. And the army should be more like the American army. First, I was amazed when I lived in America and saw how respected the army was. I will never forget this moment when I stood in line in front of this Washington monument in downtown Washington, and there was this group of American soldiers, young guys, out jogging. And the whole line started exploding. It was like a moment from an American movie when just one little boy started clapping,, and then 100 people were clapping along.

So, one thing is that we need a lot of respect for the army, and it should be the most respected profession. Second of all, I was amazed at how smart the American army is. For us in Ukraine, and it comes from the Soviet Union, serving in the army very often was a moment in life when you had to face the incredible stupidity of life.

In America, I will never forget General (David) Petraeus. Back then, he was the commander in chief in Iraq. He came in front of Congress, I think it was 2006, talking, explaining things to senators and congressmen, and absolutely turning around the whole view of the political class and of society. And he did it in such a smart, lucid way. And I want my army to be like that. I want it to be David Petraeus’ army.

Brian Bonner: Something to aspire to. Yes, we haven’t had a draft in America since 1973, and it is a volunteer military. It is paid well; the State Department is the poor stepsister to the Defense Department, which gets $1 trillion a year. The State Department gets way less.

But I’ve understood that big military budgets are essential when evil exists. It seems to me another thing, and I have never been in the military. Still, generals I talked to say the reason why military service and fighting are not so scary to American soldiers is that we arm them well, we train them well, we put them in big units where the chances of death are low, the chances of survival are high. That is some of the fear that Ukrainian soldiers have as they assess their chances: Ukrainian men who don’t want to serve. Do you see that fear?

Olexander Scherba: Well, it’s a completely different situation right now because we are in an onslaught of a country that is much bigger and much more powerful than ourselves. America will never be in that position of being attacked by someone much bigger and much more powerful than America. But yeah, I understand.

There are two ways for Ukrainian men to fight today: volunteer or be drafted. Those who volunteered are already fighting. Now it’s time for those who would be drafted. And some of the men would be scared. Everyone would be scared. Someone would be hiding and running away. But a big part of society won’t be. And a big part of the men of the age of conscription would absolutely go if they were summoned.

If the president comes to the front and says the (John F. Kennedy) speech ‘ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country,’ many people will follow this call and go to war. I see this readiness and this feeling of patriotism among at least my circle.

Honoring the fallen in Ukraine

Brian Bonner: You write about, and you personalize them, the early victims of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the 2014. The first casualty in Crimea was Reşat Ametov. And that’s a name; you did it deliberately. You wanted to personalize this. And the first SBU colonel who was killed by Girkin (Igor Girkin – Russian FSB officer and war criminal – ed.), I believe.

Olexander Scherba: Yeah, Gennadiy Belychenko, yeah. The first blood.

Brian Bonner: You go around Kyiv, and many of what used to be Soviet statues have been destroyed and demolished. Should we erect statues of our new heroes?

Olexander Scherba: I don’t think we will, quite frankly. I don’t feel it in the air that we would somehow emulate what we did during the Soviet time, but in a different way. There will be a different way to honor their memory. First, I’m a big fan of this project, we need the Ukrainian Arlington near Kyiv. I lived in Alexandria, Virginia, near Washington, and drove to work by the Arlington Cemetery. This is such an amazing, dignified way. To honor the fallen. This is what we need. We need this kind of memory. Not just putting standard monuments in every village like people did in Soviet times.

Did the West wake up from “geopolitical sleep”?

Brian Bonner: You write, and I agree, that the EU and America, the West, did not wake up to the threat of Russia. And that was by 2021. Are they awake now? Or do they want to reconcile somehow?

Olexander Scherba: They are awake, they are learning to be courageous again. In the last three decades, the West has learned that we live in a time when it’s okay to be soft. It’s okay to be at ease. We live in a time where there are no problems that cannot be resolved in a peaceful, diplomatic way. And they were right. The 21st century should be this time; it’s a civilized time.

The thing is that such a big country as Russia and a couple of others, but most importantly, Russia, has never arrived in the 21st century. And now, the West is learning to be courageous. And it’s learning from Ukraine. And unfortunately, it’s not happening as fast as it should be. In my book, I quote this 2016 survey or 2017, in which nations of Europe were asked: “Are you ready to fight with weapons in your hands for your freedom?” And the level of readiness in different countries was very low. Surprisingly low.

Brian Bonner: In Italy, it was 16%.

Olexander Scherba: In Austria and Germany, it was around 15%. In Russia, it was around 20%. Surprisingly, in Finland, it was 73%. And in Ukraine, Ukraine was ranked second. So, some countries need to rise to the occasion and become more courageous.

Brian Bonner: Finland’s a fascinating story. Do you worry that the West, after year five of the war, is just going to cut Ukraine loose like Syria? Like Afghanistan? Like Vietnam, in America’s case?

Olexander Scherba: What hurts me is that I’m speaking not as a representative of the ministry and not for Ukrainian diplomats. In my personal capacity, what hurts me and shocks me is this disarray and polarization and many insane things that are happening in the United States. And the outcome of the upcoming election. That would definitely be the night I won’t sleep.

On the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

Brian Bonner: You’ve seen a lot of foreign ministers How did you survive being in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during (Victor) Yanukovych’s time? I mean, you must have seen all the ugliness around you.

Olexander Scherba: Yeah. But surprisingly, it was a time when you were in a position where some things depended on you. You would make a lot of difference because you were the one keeping it together in a crazy time for the country and keeping the course. And I thought that was my mission. Plus, during the Yanukovych time, I was diagnosed with cancer, so I had my own Maidan, I always say. It was a crazy, difficult time in many ways, professionally and personally.

Brian Bonner: Your health is fine now?

Olexander Scherba: It’s fine now, I was lucky.

The state of officials in Ukraine

Brian Bonner: You also write, and we all know, because the people who hate Ukraine hammer us all the time with corruption and bad governance, we understand it. But there’s a big difference between being a democratic country that is trying to be better and one that is not democratic and is a source of evil. That’s Russia. But you write that Ukraine’s people have outgrown their elites, and the elites have not requited themselves well. Are they doing better during the war?

Olexander Scherba: You know, the amazing thing was, at least in the beginning, in the first and early stage of this war, even the bad elites became better. Even the corrupt people were trying to behave differently, decently. It was amazing to see the guys with zero reputation asking, where can I bring the money? Where can I contribute? Buying stuff for the army. That was one of many, many, many things that struck me in that unforgettable time.

Ukraine is improving elite-wise. I’m looking at Ukrainian diplomacy in 1995. Do you know what the most overwhelming feeling was for me as a young diplomat? The feeling of shame. Because as a young diplomat, you must be like a fly on the wall. Your function is just to take notes. And you’re sitting there and saying: “What is he saying?” It’s not the right thing; it’s not how you convince the West. It’s not how you represent the country; the words are not right.

I hope that now the people taking notes after me don’t feel that shame. Many of today’s ambassadors, who are part of the political elite, are more competent and fluent in foreign languages and less embarrassing than they were in the beginning.

Brian Bonner: I don’t have to be as diplomatic as you. I think the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is doing a great job, especially for the resources it has. And I know a lot of talented people. I think (Dmytro) Kuleba is doing a fantastic job, I like (Pavlo) Klimkin (minister of foreign affairs from June 19, 2014, until August 29, 2019 – ed.) because he was there at a very tough time for us in Ukraine.

Olexander Scherba: He’s a friend. They are my friends, so I’m very proud of them.

Brian Bonner: You wrote that Ukraine needs a Václav Havel or Angela Merkel. I’ll agree with the Havel part; the Merkel part, I don’t.

Olexander Scherba: I wouldn’t write this passage today. But back then; I am a faithful person, a Christian, and I believe in God. And I see a united, democratic Europe somehow as a fulfillment of this, largely still Christian Europe to finally live by the commandments. At least by two or three, which would be forgiveness, humility, and the strong ones serving the weaker ones. And I saw all these three things in Angela Merkel, and the humility of this person amazed me. But of course, now I understand.

Brian Bonner: She was lured by what you said, money— Nord Stream 2.

Olexander Scherba: She was not corrupt, she thought she was doing a good job for the German economy. The German economy prospered amazingly on this cheap Russian gas. But in strategic terms, not being ready to listen to Ukraine was a crime, we see it now.

Brian Bonner: Have we found our Václav Havel, or do we need hundreds of little Václav Havels?

Olexander Scherba: It’s a dream, not only for Ukraine, quite frankly.

Brian Bonner: But we’re getting better?

Olexander Scherba: We are getting there, yeah.

Closing remarks

Brian Bonner: Parting thoughts? We’re going to have to leave it there. Are we going to win the war?

Olexander Scherba: You know that we will win. We already won because we didn’t crumble when the world crumbled. We didn’t hide under the blanket when the whole world hid under the blanket.

Brian Bonner: Regarding blankets, that was your famous speech with Petro Poroshenko. He said you can’t fight with blankets.

Olexander Scherba: Yeah. And this is, by the way, the thing that Donald Trump likes to quote all the time: “You, Democrats, you are just supplying them with blankets, but me, I give them javelins.”

Brian Bonner: Well, you helped Donald Trump.

The Russians said: «We need your house» — the story of Serhii Dorokhov, abducted from Irpin

Serhii Dorokhov is a civilian hostage of the Russians and a resident of Irpin. The Russians abducted him in mid-March 2022 during the occupation of the city.

What is currently known about Serhii Dorokhov?

Oksana Dorokhova: I managed to find out where Serhii was being held in January 2023. When a soldier was released during an exchange, he mentioned that he had been in a cell with my husband for about six months. He called me from the bus after the exchange and told me that Serhii was alive.

By that time, I knew that he had been confirmed by the International Committee of the Red Cross. However, I did not know where he was or how he was doing. There was no information about his condition or even whether he was alive.

We had no contact. The only communication I received was at the end of the summer of 2022, in the form of a short note written by his hand, delivered through the DNIP: «I’m alive and well, everything is fine.» However, I later discovered that these notes were written around April 12, 2022, just after they were taken away.

«Back then, we didn’t know that men could leave as well»

Oksana Dorokhova: We live quite close to Gostomel, and it was constantly loud there, with shelling occurring all the time. It frightened me a lot, but I was afraid to leave because they were targeting cars with civilians.

Then we heard about evacuation buses transporting women, children, and the elderly. Serhii tried to persuade me to leave, but I insisted that I would not go without him.

Photo from the Dorokhov family archive / zmina.info

On March 10th, there was information about a convoy escorted by the Red Cross, and we hoped to leave by car. We hastily prepared, but the Russians didn’t grant us a corridor. Forced to return home, we found ourselves already packed with our belongings. Near the broken Romanivsky bridge, my husband put me on a bus. At that time, we were unaware that men could also depart. There was no information provided.

Serhii returned home and found elderly neighbors still there. He assisted them in getting to the evacuation bus.


Read also: «We need to get access to prisoners and give people clarity» — CEO of Amnesty International Ukraine


«We need your house»

Oksana Dorokhova: When Serhii returned, he noticed the Russians already outside. They came to search for him. On March 15, they returned and demanded, «We need your house.» Following this, on March 16th, all contact with Serhii ceased.

The individuals who remained behind reported that Russians had taken over the house and were holding Serhii somewhere in the basement.

Where the Russians took the abducted people

Oksana Dorokhova: People from Bucha and Irpin were transported to Gostomel airfield. Around the 20 of March, they were transferred to Belarus. From there, they were taken to Novozybkov, where they went through «checkups».

Serhii was taken away as the Russians were beginning to withdraw. By around March 24, he was already in Novozybkov. However, by May 2023, he was transferred from there to Donskoye in the Tula region.

The soldier who was released in January 2023 immediately called me. He contacted all the relatives of the men he had been with. He said that the detainees would be released when the war ended. He also mentioned that everyone there supported each other and that they were all like family.

The released prisoners say that the hardest part of captivity is having no idea what has happened to your family, where they are, or how they are living.


Read also: Labour rights of illegally detained civilians — a legal perspective


«There are about 400 families in Kyiv Region waiting for their relatives»

Oksana Dorokhova: Did the ICRC help in any way? No. They called twice to confirm that Serhii was verified, but there was no further communication. Sometimes they call and ask what news I know.

The Ukrainian special services explicitly say that they cannot exchange civilians.

Serhii posed absolutely no threat. He was at home. We had no weapons. He was not behaving aggressively.

I would like to hope at least for access, for them to be seen and their condition checked. And to let them know that they are not forgotten. As for the letters we wrote through the ICRC, Russia does not send any letters to the illegally detained.

People probably do not know whether their relatives are aware that they are alive.

There are about 400 families in Kyiv Region waiting for their loved ones to return from illegal Russian detention.

Problems of the families of illegally detained civilians

Oksana Dorokhova: There is state aid for the families of prisoners of war and civilian prisoners, amounting to 100 thousand hryvnias for a year of captivity. However, this year it has not been paid yet due to a lack of funds.

Many people in captivity are from territories that are still occupied. After their release, they often have nowhere to return to. While they are entitled to assistance, they have to wait several months to receive it.

Waiting for several months on the street, without housing, support, or even basic clothing, is wrong.


Read also: Sexual violence as a war crime of the occupiers


In times of war, the program «Free our relatives» tells the stories of people, cities, villages, and entire regions that have been captured by Russian invaders. We discuss the war crimes committed by the Kremlin and its troops against the Ukrainian people.

The program is hosted by Ihor Kotelyanets and Anastasia Bagalika.


This publication is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the framework of the Human Rights in Action Program implemented by Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union. Opinions, conclusions and recommendations presented in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID, the United States Government. The contents are the responsibility of the authors.

USAID is the world’s premier international development agency and a catalytic actor driving development results. USAID’s work demonstrates American generosity, and promotes a path to recipient self-reliance and resilience, and advances U.S. national security and economic prosperity. USAID has partnered with Ukraine since 1992, providing more than $9 billion in assistance. USAID’s current strategic priorities include strengthening democracy and good governance, promoting economic development and energy security, improving health care systems, and mitigating the effects of the conflict in the east.

For additional information about USAID in Ukraine, please call USAID’s Development Outreach and Communications Office at: +38 (044) 521-5753. You may also visit our website: http://www.usaid.gov/ukraine or our Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/USAIDUkraine.

«We need to get access to prisoners and give people clarity» — CEO of Amnesty International Ukraine

Amnesty International is a non-governmental organization founded in 1961 in the UK with the aim of investigating and preventing gross human rights violations and providing assistance to those whose rights have been violated.

Motivation as CEO of Amnesty International

Veronika Velch: My motivation is clear. Firstly, I spent many years away from Ukraine, living in Washington for almost 10 years. During that time, I was involved in advocacy and corporate crisis communications. However, in recent years, my focus has shifted more and more towards human rights work.

I worked with the family of Paul Rusesabagina, a well-known Rwandan case involving a man who saved many people during the genocide there. I also collaborated with Paul Whelan, who was wrongfully convicted of espionage in Russia. Despite his innocence, Russia is holding him as a hostage. Human rights activities are increasingly becoming integrated into corporate social responsibility.

Furthermore, human rights work holds critical importance in Ukraine. When Ukraine, unfortunately, withdraws from active engagement, we lose our voice in the international arena. I wouldn’t want us to resemble our eastern neighbors, where not a single active Amnesty office exists. Reopening the office in Ukraine became my goal. I believed it should be located in Kyiv because physical location shapes perspective. Just as we discuss the rotation of military personnel at the front, I find it fair to rotate professional Ukrainians who have worked abroad for an extended period and have the opportunity to return home.

And I would add that this is a family story. My husband is a former political prisoner, a Crimean.

Amnesty International and release mechanisms: do they exist?

Veronika Velch: The human rights movement was founded on the principle of conducting research. These studies must be objective and balanced. This way, the international community, within the framework of International Humanitarian Law and the UN Charter, can make informed decisions about the aggressor.

The next goal is for Amnesty to develop an advocacy movement with a common vision. That is why we are currently working on a report related to civilian prisoners.

First and foremost, this report is being produced to give us an independent voice in the international community. Amnesty is part of an advisory body to UNESCO. Twice a year, we speak and add to the agenda what we think is necessary. For example, UNESCO does not currently consider illegally detained civilians a priority. Nevertheless, we still bring it up for discussion because it provides a significant platform and reach to numerous countries where we can be heard.

We have offices at the Council of Europe in Geneva and in New York. When a report like this comes out, it provides us with a seriously reasoned position. We can emphasize that these are real people and their fates—these are not just numbers.

What is happening in the Kharkiv region is particularly painful for me now. The world is watching in confusion, not understanding what will happen next because there is no clear mechanism yet. All we can do as human rights activists, both Ukrainian and international, is to develop a common vision and help the Ukrainian voice be heard and not forgotten, which is critically important.


Read also: Labour rights of illegally detained civilians — a legal perspective


«Today we operate within the existing framework»

Veronika Velch: I can refer to the previous report. The situation is not improving yet. However, the most important goal is to recognize «civilian hostages» within the framework of international law. In our last report, we initiated a conversation about the fact that people who are captured and transported from one place to another against their will, without due process, are victims of Russian war crimes.

We can discuss extensively how the international legal framework and the architecture of international relations should be changed. However, as of today, we operate within the existing framework. Our main goal is to ensure that people who are prisoners in the occupied territories receive legal support.

We demand constant access to these people in the occupied territories, which Russia completely ignores. This once again confirms the violation of International Humanitarian Law. This forms the basis for explaining to international partners exactly what is happening.

In any case, no matter what happens or what Russia claims, these people are considered innocent until proven guilty. This principle forms the basis of human rights activity.

Amnesty International’s annual report on the human rights situation in Ukraine for 2023

What can we do about it? We need to publicize these cases on the international stage and demand that our partners become more involved. We may need to involve third parties. This is a way to solve the problem together. The key is to ensure that no one turns a blind eye.


Read also: Sexual violence as a war crime of the occupiers


Is the concept of «political prisoner» still relevant?

Veronika Velch: We have ceased using the term «political prisoners» because every person, irrespective of political, religious, or any other biases, has the right to protection. The international community is increasingly moving away from this terminology, although I acknowledge that such situations can exist at the state level.

Indeed, the trend of distinguishing between prisoners of war, civilian prisoners, hostages, and others is concerning. The primary focus should always be on protecting individuals, regardless of their status.

Presently, it’s mainly our authorized state bodies that compile such lists (lists of political prisoners – ed.). I’m not even sure if any civil society or international organization in Ukraine has the access or expertise to undertake such tasks. The situation is similar regarding civilian hostages.

We can receive and distribute individual cases. Our approach is that one case can help others. Gaining access to one or two prisoners of war or hostages enables us to gain access to others.

«We are in a vacuum»

Veronika Velch: Amnesty needs to be engaged not only in Ukraine but also internationally. While organizing actions in Ukraine is important, it is not the primary method of influence. Holding such actions globally is critically important.

When we speak with other Amnesty directors, they are shocked to learn that we don’t have any access to these individuals. Thus, we need to dispel the myths that exist even among our colleagues. There is often a lack of understanding that Ukrainian military prisoners, civilian hostages, and even Ukrainian children are completely losing contact with their homeland, which is illegal. It’s crucial to highlight the risks these individuals may face.

We are currently in a dire vacuum. Russia, the aggressor, is disregarding all established norms of the international legal order. I often tell my international partners: there was once a chessboard upon which we all played, and it was called diplomacy. Now, Putin has overturned the board and is simply using it to beat everyone over the head. Meanwhile, Ukraine continues to suffer. Yet, others insist on returning everything to the way it was and continuing to play.


Read also: For them, people are a propaganda tool: the story of a civilian hostage Oleh Bohdanov


On the importance of access to prisoners

Veronika Velch: We need to start considering our options for the possibility of a protracted war. Ideally, we should work towards rewriting the security architecture and establishing a tribunal for Putin. However, a crucial question is how we can ensure that Ukrainians are informed about what is happening to their relatives.

If we are unable to secure their immediate release or establish a clear mechanism, then we must consider what actions we can take now to provide clarity to people, facilitate access for a group of people, and possibly reduce instances of torture. It would be incredibly important to ensure that letters can at least reach them and that communication flows both ways—from us to them and from them to us.

Why does Russia not allow access? I spoke extensively with the families of Azovstal’s defenders who were in detention. Everyone unanimously expressed that, in addition to physical torture, the lack of information was the most dreadful aspect. Soldiers were informed that Ukraine had long since vanished from memory, that everyone had forgotten about them, and that they would be tortured indefinitely. When a person is unaware of what awaits them, it is highly demotivating.

Action in support of prisoners of war / Photos: Coordination Centre

About the preparation of the report

Veronika Velch: The report is already available and is undergoing proofreading by our Law and Policy Team. This process is highly intricate, and it’s crucial for us that all parties participate and comprehend it.

However, even as we finalize one report, Russia is once again occupying new territories.

This only underscores the urgency of persisting in our efforts and prioritizing individuals from the vast pool of those we can address.


Read also: How to release journalists-hostages of the Putin regime?


In times of war, the program «Free our relatives» tells the stories of people, cities, villages, and entire regions that have been captured by Russian invaders. We discuss the war crimes committed by the Kremlin and its troops against the Ukrainian people.

The program is hosted by Ihor Kotelyanets and Anastasia Bagalika.


This publication is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the framework of the Human Rights in Action Program implemented by Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union. Opinions, conclusions and recommendations presented in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID, the United States Government. The contents are the responsibility of the authors.

USAID is the world’s premier international development agency and a catalytic actor driving development results. USAID’s work demonstrates American generosity, and promotes a path to recipient self-reliance and resilience, and advances U.S. national security and economic prosperity. USAID has partnered with Ukraine since 1992, providing more than $9 billion in assistance. USAID’s current strategic priorities include strengthening democracy and good governance, promoting economic development and energy security, improving health care systems, and mitigating the effects of the conflict in the east.

For additional information about USAID in Ukraine, please call USAID’s Development Outreach and Communications Office at: +38 (044) 521-5753. You may also visit our website: http://www.usaid.gov/ukraine or our Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/USAIDUkraine.

Labour rights of illegally detained civilians — a legal perspective

About keeping your job

Yulia Polekhina: The protection of labor rights for illegally detained civilians after February 24, 2022, is enshrined in the Labour Code, among other legislative acts. This is covered under our Article 119, which provides guarantees for employees.

It states that a person who, in accordance with the Law of Ukraine on Social and Legal Protection of Persons, has been confirmed to be deprived of personal liberty, retains their job for the entire period of deprivation. An additional 6 months from the date of release is also provided if the person undergoes medical or other rehabilitation activities, including psychological assistance. These activities may include various restorative measures established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

It must be confirmed that the person was illegally detained as a result of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. This applies to people who are officially employed. For those who are not officially employed, the process will be longer. It is necessary to establish through the court the existence of labor relations with the institution or organization where they worked.

Suspension of an employment contract

Yulia Polekhina: Under martial law, the concept of an employment contract was introduced. This involves a temporary suspension of the employer’s obligation to provide employment to the employee and a temporary suspension of the employee’s obligation to perform their work under officially concluded employment contracts. An employment contract may be suspended for reasons that make it impossible to provide and perform work. It must be a bilateral process.

If a person is under occupation and the enterprise is relocated to territory controlled by the Ukrainian authorities, the employer cannot provide the person with the opportunity to continue performing their duties. In such cases, the employment contract is suspended. However, the suspension of an employment contract does not terminate the employment relationship.

The employer’s right is not absolute. It cannot be used as any form of coercion or, for example, revenge. This is a temporary cessation of employment by the employer and a temporary cessation of work by the employees in connection with the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. There are many reasons for this, such as active hostilities in a locality, temporary occupation, proximity to a war zone, destruction of production facilities or certain equipment, or the absence of an employee who is abroad or in the occupied territory when enterprise is relocated.

The desire of one party, in the absence of objective circumstances, is not a ground for suspending an employment contract. If a person simply does not want to work, this is not a valid reason for suspension.

Both the employee and the employer can initiate the suspension. This may be done through electronic communications. For example, the employer may send the agreement by email. The suspension of an employment agreement is valid for a period not exceeding the duration of martial law.


Read also: Sexual violence as a war crime of the occupiers


«Got fired in violation of the law» — what to do?

Yulia Polekhina: The employee must go to the company, report that they have arrived, and inquire about the status of their workplace. If they are told that they have been fired, they should request reinstatement.

These issues can be resolved out of court. I have never encountered a case where a company did not want to resolve it. It is usually sufficient for a person to go to their employer and submit an application for reinstatement. The employer then reinstates them.

About the salary

Yulia Polekhina: The issue of wages is more problematic. The employer must record the salary that the employee should have received for the period they did not work due to the occupation or detention. However, this financial support must be paid by the aggressor state.

That is, a person can apply for reinstatement. When they perform their job duties, they will receive their salary. As for the period of forced absence, this is a matter for the aggressor state.

There is only one category of citizens for whom it is stated that the company should pay this. These are citizens who went missing under special circumstances, but who were authorized to perform state functions at the time of their disappearance or detention. These include starostas, local self-government bodies, executive authorities, and other positions. Such persons retain their place of work, position, and average salary


Read also: For them, people are a propaganda tool: the story of a civilian hostage Oleh Bohdanov


Should the company try t0 find out what happened to their employee

Yulia Polekhina: There is such an obligation. It is businesses that are obliged to keep records. If a person goes missing and the business is unaware of their whereabouts (for instance, if they relocated their company from Mariupol), they must maintain a record of this.

Of course, they are not obliged to find out what is happening to that person. They cannot know that. If it’s a small company with a people-oriented approach, they may be able to gather information through the person’s relatives, if such information is available.

According to the Criminal Code, any individual or legal entity can file a complaint with the police. We do not know whether the missing person has any relatives. The company has the right to contact the police. We can inform them that, for example, a person from the city of Mariupol is unreachable.

First, they will fulfill their civic duty. If a person has disappeared and someone has already reported it, the cases will be merged.

On establishing the fact of illegal detention

Yulia Polekhina: We cannot establish the fact of illegal detention in court, as there is a pre-trial procedure in place. This involves a commission tasked with determining the deprivation of personal liberty resulting from the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The court cannot assume responsibility for establishing this fact, as it falls within the purview of the commission. Our recourse lies in filing a lawsuit against the commission if they fail to establish this fact.

Is there a possibility to receive financial compensation?

Yulia Polekhina: There is a practice of suing Russia. For instance, there is a decision from the Pechersk District Court of Kyiv, where the court ruled to recover compensation for property and non-pecuniary damage from the Russian Federation in favor of the individual. These decisions are legally binding and enforceable. They are not merely filed away; rather, everything will proceed through recourse lawsuits later on.

A commission is already being established to facilitate the transfer of certain seized assets of Russian citizens. It is necessary to apply to Ukrainian courts for the recognition of, for example, forced absences.


Read also: How to release journalists-hostages of the Putin regime?


In times of war, the program «Free our relatives» tells the stories of people, cities, villages, and entire regions that have been captured by Russian invaders. We discuss the war crimes committed by the Kremlin and its troops against the Ukrainian people.

The program is hosted by Ihor Kotelyanets and Anastasia Bagalika.


This publication is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the framework of the Human Rights in Action Program implemented by Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union. Opinions, conclusions and recommendations presented in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID, the United States Government. The contents are the responsibility of the authors.

USAID is the world’s premier international development agency and a catalytic actor driving development results. USAID’s work demonstrates American generosity, and promotes a path to recipient self-reliance and resilience, and advances U.S. national security and economic prosperity. USAID has partnered with Ukraine since 1992, providing more than $9 billion in assistance. USAID’s current strategic priorities include strengthening democracy and good governance, promoting economic development and energy security, improving health care systems, and mitigating the effects of the conflict in the east.

For additional information about USAID in Ukraine, please call USAID’s Development Outreach and Communications Office at: +38 (044) 521-5753. You may also visit our website: http://www.usaid.gov/ukraine or our Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/USAIDUkraine.

Front row view: what's happening on the frontline in Ukraine?

Brian Bonner: Good day. Brian Bonner here with Ukraine Calling. I’m very excited to have Askold Krushelnycky with me today. Hello, Askold.

Askold Krushelnycky: Brian, it’s great to be here. Thanks for inviting me.

Brian Bonner: Askold is one of the premier war reporters of our time. He started, whether he wanted to or not, covering wars from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980. He is, through the Ukrainian diaspora, the son of World War II refugees. He’s worked for all kinds of UK and other newspapers.

He and I share the distinction of being Kyiv Post chief editors, two of only 15 people in the world who have that title. He was, for a year and a half during a tumultuous period in American politics, the Washington correspondent for the Kyiv Post when I was still the chief editor there, covering all the Trump impeachment shenanigans and scandals that happened there.

What is the situation on the frontline?

Brian Bonner: The reason why he is here today, is he just came back from the front and we’re so grateful to have him to give us the real insider’s front-row view of what is happening on the front lines. And so, lots of questions. Are we winning? Are we losing? What’s troop morale? Is troop shortage real? How did the troops greet the coming arrival of American aid? You were there for everything. Well, how was the situation?

Askold Krushelnycky: I have been here since the beginning of the full-blown invasion in 2022. I was almost certain that Putin would invade. So I came here on February 16th, 2022, and I stayed for 10 months in 2022, six months last year, and I’ve been here since early February. So I’m able to do a comparison of how things have changed.

On all those occasions, I’ve done a tour in my car around Ukraine. I think three or four times in 2022, the entire country, and three times last year. I’ve just returned from another tour, which took me mostly to eastern Ukraine. I’ve spoken to a variety of people. And as I’ve told you, I’ve always found it very helpful over the years to talk to, as far as the military goes, to ordinary soldiers or lieutenants, sergeants, NCOs, captains, and majors.

At that kind of level, if they trust you, they’re willing to open up and give you a quite honest assessment of what’s happening. With a general or with a president or prime minister, you more or less know what they’re going to tell you. They’re not going to break some big story or give away big secrets to you. But these people, if they trust you, and many of them become my friends over the years, they’ll give an honest assessment.

Everyone knows that many of these Ukrainian troops have been in the same positions, some for over two years. I know of one brigade that’s been on what’s called the Bakhmut Front since May 2022. In peacetime, they’re based in Kolomyia in Western Ukraine, Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast. They get a pitiful amount of leave time, so they’re not able to see their families. There’s a lot of worry and concern about familial matters.

They’re also just exhausted. Nobody’s ready to throw in the white towel; nobody’s saying we’ve got to start negotiating because nobody trusts Putin. But there is a weariness and an eagerness for something to be done with conscription so that they can rest.

Brian Bonner: Is the troop shortage real?

Askold Krushelnycky: The troop shortage is real. And the Ukrainian high command or the general staff is not trying to conceal that anymore. They’ve used euphemistic language previously, but in the same way that they’ve been very open about having to cede territory in recent weeks and recent days, that they’ve withdrawn from places. A withdrawal, however, you count it, is a retreat. And even if it’s planned, it’s not a route. It’s not something that any commander-in-chief is eager to do.

Brian Bonner: Even if it’s just a village going backwards is going back.

Askold Krushelnycky: But that’s the kind of war Ukraine’s in. Apart from spectacular advances, such as in the fall of 2022, by Ukrainians to retake big swathes of Kharkiv, most of them are incremental movements. But as people have said, every meter is soaked in blood or lost limbs.

What is going on in Chasiv Yar?

Brian Bonner: How severe is the troop shortage based on what the troops told you? And I do not doubt that they confided in you because you’re very trustworthy, you’ve known these people for a long time. Is it critical to the point where some pundits say there could be a breakthrough by Russia? They could take over Chasiv Yar, the strategic city in Donetsk Oblast. Is it that bad?

Askold Krushelnycky: In Chasiv Yar, the principal problem isn’t manpower. It’s the obstructions in Congress that produced this dramatic reduction in U.S. supplies. And it meant that these glide bombs have pummeled Chasiv Yar, these CAB bombs, different types of missiles and drones, without having much in the way of a response—and ordinary artillery.

Instead of artillery, they’ve been using FPV, first-person view drones. They’ve been using them very effectively, and they’ve managed to hold the line. But they’ve told me the Russians have FPVs as well. They’ve also got seemingly limitless amounts of artillery and ammunition. And it is close enough there for Russian Soviet-era artillery to be used.

Brian Bonner: Is it going to fall?

Askold Krushelnycky: I’ve learned very early in this kind of conflict reporting that the people who think they know what will happen have almost inevitably been wrong. I’ll tell you what people that I’ve spoken to there said. They said that unless they get supplies coming in rapidly to enable them to start using their artillery again and rocket systems, if they get anti-aircraft defense, which can knock down the Russian planes that launch CABs, these glide bombs, from beyond the present reach of Ukrainian defenses, then the situation can change. And it is changing.

But if the Russians just carry on pounding away in the way that they’ve done elsewhere and don’t seem to care about how many people they lose, then theoretically, yeah, they could take it. But it’s not going to happen, I think. People have said the Kremlin would like it as a victory celebration for May 9th. I think it’s much further off than that, and it’s impossible to call it.

Brian Bonner: How important is that? You’ve written about how important keeping control of that city is. Why?

Askold Krushelnycky: Because it is at a high point. It’s not like it’s on a mountaintop, but if you’re driving towards that area from, say, northwest Kramatorsk and Slovyansk. You’re driving along the road, which then takes you through Druzhkiuka and Konstantynivka, and you can see the lay of the land. You can see that it’s getting higher where Chasiv Yar is. And it doesn’t have to be a mountain. It just needs to be significantly higher to give any artillery position there a huge advantage.

An artillery controlling Chasiv Yar can hit the four big remaining Ukrainian-held centers (of Donetsk Region – ed.), which are the ones I’ve enumerated: Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkiuka, Konstantynivka. And they can hit those; they can hit Konstantynivka.

Brian Bonner: Ukraine needs to hold that at all costs?

Askold Krushelnycky: Taking Chasiv Yar provides the Russians with a big opportunity to grab or just pummel into destruction these last remaining towns of any size in the Donetsk Region.

Brian Bonner: So we need to hold it.

Askold Krushelnycky: That’s one of Ukraine’s priorities, to do that.

Manpower shortage issue

Brian Bonner: If manpower shortage is not the big problem there, where did you see a real critical or a critical manpower shortage anywhere?

Askold Krushelnycky: You know, I just visit portions of the front, so I get snapshots of places. I don’t have the general staff feeding me statistics about Ukrainian casualties, deaths, wounded, and so on. I can only get anecdotal stuff from the people that I meet, and in some places, it’s been pure bad luck.

I know of colleagues who’ve visited places where the people have said there were 100 of us this time last year, and now only nine are still fit to fight. The rest are dead or wounded. All it takes is for one big piece of ordinance to say “land” in the wrong place, and 50 people can be taken out immediately.

I haven’t seen places where there are deserted positions. The numbers that they’re talking about, the importance of numbers, are that they want fresh people to be trained up so they can replace, give rest, and allow leave to some of these people who are exhausted. They’re exhausted both physically but also are debilitating psychologically. As I’ve said, I’ve never encountered people who’ve said, “We’ve had enough; we’re going to surrender.” But I’ve seen them over this period of the last two years, and I’ve seen the tiredness. And that is an important thing to address.

Brian Bonner: Ukraine waited months before lowering the conscription age from 27 to 25, which is still pretty high for a nation at war. What do the soldiers there make of that? And what is their attitude towards men who avoid military service?

Askold Krushelnycky: Lots of people, obviously, understandably upset, angry, that they’ve been doing what they think is the right thing to do. They’re not demanding to be called heroes. But they are angry at people who seem to be not just avoiding service but doing it in a flaunting manner. I’ve spoken to people who’ve been angered by some young kids driving around in expensive cars around Kyiv.

Brian Bonner: And there’s almost a million fighting-age men abroad.

Askold Krushelnycky: Again, on an anecdotal level, people were pleased with the Ukrainian government’s decision to lower or suspend diplomatic services in consulates and embassies for Ukrainian men of fighting age who are abroad unless they can explain why they need to be in those countries.

Brian Bonner: Why do you think we waited so long on that? And is it too late or not really, when you’re talking about a long war?

Askold Krushelnycky: I haven’t spent much time so far since coming to Ukraine on this occasion in Kyiv and I haven’t spoken to politicians. If elections are suspended; no serious people want a presidential election to be held; I don’t see what the political consequences for lowering this.

Brian Bonner: Got to win the war.

Askold Krushelnycky: Yeah, without winning the war, all of this is, like somebody would say, rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.

Brian Bonner: You know, now they’re open about it, and the US and the Western partners applied pressure, too. But I think the greatest pressure came from the military, who you talk to regularly because they need more people. We still don’t know how many more. Do you have any sense of whether the army needs to double?

Askold Krushelnycky: I haven’t got access to that kind of statistics. And much of it also depends on what the Russians do. Before we started recording this, we talked about how things may play out. I don’t have any rigid idea; I think it’s foolish. Anybody who says: “I know what’s going to happen,” is either an idiot or arrogant.

Many important factors can depend on Western support, principally the US. If Trump returns to the White House in the US presidential elections, that’s probably not good news for Ukraine. For me, one of the likeliest big changes, a breakthrough change, could happen in Russia. With people that we call “the elite” or “the power brokers” there, we’re pretty certain that many of them would like to see Putin removed. They’re too scared, or they think it would make their position vulnerable. But I think that that’s one of the likeliest.

Is Ukraine ready for a long war?

Brian Bonner: So the longer the war, the greater the likelihood. We’ve been wishing for that. And we hope it’s not just wishful thinking because we’re talking about three elements. So if the West provides everything that Ukraine needs to win, all the weapons without hesitation, they’ve been hesitating a lot. And opposition mounts in Russia, that could be another way to end the war.

What more does Ukraine need to do? There is talk that even if Ukraine wins, when Ukraine wins on the battlefield, Russia will not be a gracious loser. They will be a sore loser who lives next door and will want to always get even with Ukraine for the humiliation that they suffered during the war. And will always be attacking Ukraine with whatever they have.

Do you agree with that? And does that argue that Ukraine will have to make the painful transition from basically a democratic, peaceful society to a permanent Israel on a permanent war footing?

Askold Krushelnycky: Their whole history under Tsarism, Stalinist communism, or this kind of psychopathic banditry shows that they’re not good losers. And Putin hasn’t made Russia the way it is; I think that Putin is a product of Russia. Whether it’s Tsarist or communist or the present environment, too many Russians still crave or are willing to be subservient to a ghastly figure like Putin.

They will, of course, try to punish Ukraine and wreak revenge however they can. And I, like you, have heard that possibly what awaits Ukraine is a sort of Israeli solution where it’s not exactly permanent war, but it’s never peace. Everybody has to have some sort of training to come to the defense of their country from the age of 18. We’re a long way from that, but you’ve got to start somewhere.

And you’ve probably also heard the example of Switzerland, which has managed to avoid war for so long. But again, where every male person (is obliged to join the military – ed.), I don’t know whether females are also trained. And they have access to weapons.

Demands of your population aren’t necessarily anti-democratic; they’re not something that’s not concomitant with democracy. And unless there’s some miraculous transformation in Russian attitudes toward Ukraine, that is likely the way that Ukraine will have to think about developing.

Brian Bonner: It’s painful, though. Do you think Ukraine will get there as a society? Do you see evidence that it will?

Askold Krushelnycky: Well, we’ve seen that since 2014, there’s been a transformation in Ukrainian society. Many people said that if Putin had pressed on in 2014, if he’d just openly used Russian forces, well, he did, but pretended that they weren’t there in places like Debaltsevo and Ilovaisk.

But suppose he continued in the fashion he has been since February 2022. In that case, he may have taken bigger swathes of Ukraine because, psychologically, the resistance amongst the population might not have been there. Although it was in surprising places. Kharkiv resisted, and Odea resisted. So Ukraine was never fond of being annexed by Russia, like the Kremlin propagandists said.

We’ve seen how Ukrainian society has transformed since 2014 and again since 2022. A stark example for me was that in 2022, I was in Kharkiv just a few days before February 24, when the full-blown invasion began. You could mostly hear Russian on the streets. When I went there again last year, there were more Ukrainians on the streets.

I’ve spent some weeks there, and Ukrainian is prevalent on the streets. And lots of younger people, people of all ages, have made a principled decision to brush up on their Ukrainian and transform. Ukrainian society can adapt to the needs of the people and has successfully transformed positively. And if Ukrainians see that sort of transformation, this kind of preparation for the defense of your country, having training for everyone, even if they don’t get sent to the front lines, but in the worst-case scenario, everybody can pick up a weapon. I think Ukrainians will be open to that.

Can we count on the West to support Ukraine?

Brian Bonner: Can we count on the West to support Ukraine? I say “we”. I’m American, but I’m a permanent resident of Ukraine, so I often say “we” about Ukraine. Can we count on that support? And it seems like if not, we’d better develop our weapons in big quantities.

Askold Krushelnycky: Both of those last statements are worth pondering on. I don’t think we can 100% rely (on the support of the West – ed.). We’ve seen, unfortunately, in other instances where the West has abandoned its allies, so you can never dismiss that. Also, the West isn’t a unitary system. It’s not Putin, and it’s not a dictatorship.

We’re used to kicking out our governments every four or five years. At the most, in the US, a president will have an eight-year stretch. Many new administrations need learning time to come up to scratch, which is why I think that both George Bush Jr. and, after him, Obama and Hillary Clinton tried to make nice with Putin. It took them a year and 18 months to see that he was just pulling their chains.

Brian Bonner: Well, there are transformations we talked about. Hopefully, they will all have their “Emmanuel Macron moment” and move to becoming hawks.

Askold Krushelnycky: It’s impossible to predict. We have seen a learning arc in the Western countries. NATO and others hold themselves to be democratic countries where they shied away from angering Moscow, angering Putin, Macron being the most dramatic.

Brian Bonner: Well, we still have ways to go.

Askold Krushelnycky: Right, there still is a way. But they have come to accept the message that Kyiv was drumming into them long before the 2022 February invasion. For years, Kyiv had been saying: “This is not just our conflict.” This is the fate of democracy, to a large extent, worldwide. It depends on allowing Ukraine to fall or making sure that Ukraine wins.

Brian Bonner: We’re making progress on that.

Askold Krushelnycky: There has been progress.

Brian Bonner: You know, I think, and you said it, unfortunately, Ukrainians have to get killed and get bombed before the West realizes, really starts thinking, well, what happens? What are the consequences if Ukraine loses? And if there is a big hope, would you see hope that the West has? I know it’s not one entity, but generally, there is a consensus that we have to stop.

Askold Krushelnycky: The trend has been in that direction because, as we both know, the West is a jigsaw of different types of slightly different political systems, characters, and historical attitudes, but the trend has favored Ukraine. And I think that those countries that have given any kind of help, military help to Ukraine, know that Russia isn’t going to forgive them.

Russian use of illegal weapons

Brian Bonner: Before we wrap up, I’ve been reading a lot of reports of chemical weapons use. Do you come across Russians using illegal, banned chemical weapons?

Askold Krushelnycky: Look, I’ve asked people about that, and in some places, they’ve said that it’s like the equivalent of tear gas. I haven’t come across places where people have been fatally affected by chemical weapons. However, I think that the Ukrainian government and the military did present some evidence. They want an independent view, which won’t affect the Russians because they’ll say it’s not independent. The Russians can do that if they think they can if there aren’t witnesses to it.

The future of Kerch Bridge and closing remarks

Brian Bonner: What should we look for this summer? And I won’t hold you to the prediction. Is the Kerch Bridge coming down?

Askold Krushelnycky: What I’ve been told is that the Kerch Bridge, Ukraine can make it unusable by the Russians, at least for a time. Doing it just as a one-off to show they can do it is not particularly useful. It should be part of, I’ve been told, a more elaborate coordinated advance. Maybe to cut a way through to the Azov Sea, to sever the land bridge from Russia to Crimea as part of a broader operation. But I’ve been told that when you see the Kerch Bridge hit, you can expect exciting events.

Brian Bonner: Askold, I know you’ve got a lot of trips and a lot more reporting to do. Do you have another book on this?

Askold Krushelnycky: I had a book proposal with an agent in January 2022. And when this all kicked off, a full-blown invasion, I thought I’d better hold off. I don’t know if I regret that, but I still want to do a book. And I’ve got a heck of a load of just very personal stories from extraordinary people, soldiers, civilians who are brave, kind, decent, wonderful people. If I can somehow write about those just a sliver, a fraction, conveyed to a broader audience, the extraordinary, the magnificence of these people, I’d like to do that. But I know a crop of interesting books is already on the horizon.

Brian Bonner: I’m looking forward to yours because I neglected to mention this great book: “An Orange Revolution: A Personal Journey through Ukrainian History.”

Sexual violence as a war crime of the occupiers

Sexual violence as a «weapon» of the Russians

Khrystyna Kit: The experience of armed conflicts in other countries shows that survivors of sexual violence often begin discussing it many years later—10, 15, even 20 years afterward. This delay is attributed to the trauma these individuals have endured. They are not always immediately prepared to testify about the violence they have experienced.

Russians employ sexual violence as a «weapon.» Officially, such facts and patterns are documented by law enforcement agencies, including the Office of the Prosecutor General and the National Police. On March 26, 2024, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights published a report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, which detailed the use of sexual violence against civilians and Ukrainian prisoners of war unlawfully detained by Russia. Typically, this entails torture of a sexualized nature, such as the use of electric shocks, the application of electric current to the genitals, or other forms of sexualized violence.

These crimes are perpetrated against both women and men. The intention behind their use is to assert dominance, humiliate, and intimidate. Sexual violence is employed to exert influence not only on the individuals targeted by these acts but also on those who are compelled to witness or hear about such instances of torture. In doing so, perpetrators aim to showcase their power in the occupied territories.

If we analyze the reports of international organizations, we find evidence of sexualized torture and sexual violence against the wives, daughters, and husbands of Ukrainian servicemen and women. This constitutes a clear act of revenge.

Among the victims we represent are volunteers. Additionally, there are women who were discovered with literature on the history of Ukraine or any pro-Ukrainian literature. These individuals were subjected to torture and sexual assault specifically due to their pro-Ukrainian stance.


Read also: How to release journalists-hostages of the Putin regime?


Why Russians use sexual violence?

Khrystyna Kit: The fact that Russians use sexual violence as a weapon doesn’t excuse their despicable actions. They deliberately choose this method of warfare, which is utterly destructive to civilization. It’s not about satisfying sexual desires or attractions; it’s about the complete destruction of an individual, both externally and internally. Moreover, it’s not just about harming a specific individual who has been subjected to this crime. It’s about destabilizing the entire community, eroding societal bonds and connections within Ukrainian society.

Survivors of sexual violence perpetrated by Russian military personnel frequently endure severe consequences for their mental and physical health. However, the most prevalent effects are often self-isolation and alienation from society.

We’ve encountered situations where Russians perpetrated widespread sexual violence in the formerly occupied territories. Specifically, there were instances where they resided in the homes of Ukrainian women for extended periods and subjected these women to rape, coercing them into providing care. Following the de-occupation, these women were left to fend for themselves, as the community completely isolated them. People stopped communicating with them and ceased to trust them.

We cannot afford to isolate the survivors of these crimes from our society. On the contrary, we should support these individuals and help them integrate. The fact that they survived this crime was not their choice. They were not given the opportunity to refuse or defend themselves. Their choice was between life and death.

Sexual violence is a deliberate tactic employed by Russians. It serves to instill fear and intimidation within the local community, fostering a climate of distrust among its members. Ultimately, it aims to completely dismantle our society.


Read also: How the Moscow Mechanism will help release illegally detained civilians


Sexual violence as a crime of genocide

Khrystyna Kit: Sexual violence as a crime of genocide can manifest in various forms. For instance, it may involve the use of measures or actions intended to prevent Ukrainians from having children. For example, Russian military personnel might administer specific medications to ensure that Ukrainian women are unable to conceive. This constitutes deliberate harm to an individual’s reproductive function with the aim of preventing the birth of more Ukrainians.

From a legal standpoint, one form of sexual violence and criminal genocide is forced pregnancy, wherein women are impregnated with the intention of bearing children of a different ethnicity or DNA makeup. This act aims to alter the ethnic composition of a population.

Sexual violence as a form of genocide can indeed occur, but proving it can be a highly complex and time-consuming process.

When discussing the temporary detention centers where civilians illegally imprisoned by the Russians were held, it’s evident that genital mutilation was indeed employed. In the investigation of these crimes, if reproductive disorders are confirmed and it can be demonstrated that these are not isolated incidents but rather part of a systematic approach by the Russians, then we would certainly have grounds to discuss the crime of genocide.


Read also: Political sponsor for those illegally imprisoned by the Russians — explains the wife of the civilian hostage


The least identified forms of sexual violence

Khrystyna Kit: We provide legal assistance not only to women but also to men who have experienced sexual violence at the hands of Russian military personnel. Among our 30 cases, approximately 10 involve male survivors.

These crimes mainly involve the application of electric shocks to the genitals, which constitutes a sexualized form of torture. Victims often endure such torture without immediately recognizing its sexualized nature.

Threats of sexual violence are considered a form of sexual violence too. When an individual is threatened with rape or torture of a sexualized nature, it constitutes a crime, and it’s crucial to recognize this fact.

The least recognized form of sexual violence is forced nudity. Individuals often struggle to identify it as such. For instance, they may recount being coerced to strip naked or perform physical exercises like squats or push-ups. Although they may not label it as rape or torture, it is indeed sexualized violence. Every person who has experienced this has the right to be protected and to receive the necessary assistance.


Read also: Why illegally detained civilians are left without social protection from the state


The taboo nature of the topic

Khrystyna Kit: In most cases, individuals do not proactively approach law enforcement agencies or NGOs to report instances of sexual violence.

The majority of men who have experienced sexual violence have been held in captivity, whether in temporary detention centers or other places of confinement. When they come forward to testify, they often describe their experiences in terms of torture rather than sexual violence. However, through conversations with them, we can discern the sexualized nature of the crimes they endured.

When discussing women who have experienced conflict-related sexual violence perpetrated by Russian military personnel, these are typically women who were not in captivity. Instead, they were forcibly removed from their homes or subjected to rape in various settings, such as forests or checkpoints. Some were assaulted when military personnel purportedly came to their homes under the guise of searching or verifying information.

That is, they were not held captive or in places of detention and were not tortured. These women immediately begin to talk about sexual violence, and they do not want to testify about it on their own initiative to law enforcement agencies. They can start talking about it only after a long period of work with a psychotherapist, psychologist or when they have a trusting relationship with NGOs.

Indeed, it’s often easier for people to discuss torture than to openly address sexual violence. The latter can be more emotionally challenging and may carry greater stigma and shame for survivors. As a result, discussing sexual violence in its purest form can be more difficult for individuals.

Currently, efforts are underway to streamline the process for victims of sexual violence, minimizing their need to interact with multiple specialists or visit various offices for assistance. The aim is to establish a single entry point, a centralized window, where individuals can access comprehensive help and support. This approach ensures that survivors receive the full range of assistance they require from a single source.


Read also: For them, people are a propaganda tool: the story of a civilian hostage Oleh Bohdanov


In times of war, the program «Free our relatives» tells the stories of people, cities, villages, and entire regions that have been captured by Russian invaders. We discuss the war crimes committed by the Kremlin and its troops against the Ukrainian people.

The program is hosted by Ihor Kotelyanets and Anastasia Bagalika.


This publication is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the framework of the Human Rights in Action Program implemented by Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union. Opinions, conclusions and recommendations presented in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID, the United States Government. The contents are the responsibility of the authors.

USAID is the world’s premier international development agency and a catalytic actor driving development results. USAID’s work demonstrates American generosity, and promotes a path to recipient self-reliance and resilience, and advances U.S. national security and economic prosperity. USAID has partnered with Ukraine since 1992, providing more than $9 billion in assistance. USAID’s current strategic priorities include strengthening democracy and good governance, promoting economic development and energy security, improving health care systems, and mitigating the effects of the conflict in the east.

For additional information about USAID in Ukraine, please call USAID’s Development Outreach and Communications Office at: +38 (044) 521-5753. You may also visit our website: http://www.usaid.gov/ukraine or our Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/USAIDUkraine.

Ukraine is on the frontline of democracy, but can it keep its own?

Brian Bonner: Hello, everybody. This is Brian Bonner. Welcome to this week’s Ukraine Calling on Hromadske Radio. We have a special treat. I have Professor Lucan A. Way in the studio with me. He is the co-director of the Petro Jacyk Program for the Study of Ukraine at the University of Toronto, one of the great global capitals of the Ukrainian diaspora. Welcome to the program, Professor.

Lucan Way: Thanks, it’s great to be here.

What is the motivation to study Ukraine?

Brian Bonner: You’re neither Canadian nor Ukrainian. You’re American, with more degrees than I could stuff inside my head and more knowledge of Ukraine than I have. How did you end up where you are?

Lucan Way: In the 1980s, I was a college student, and there was perestroika (reforms in the USSR that lasted from 1985 until 1991—ed.). Things were happening in the Soviet Union. I came to Moscow and then started living in Ukraine in the 1990s. I was a graduate student working as a consultant for the World Bank. I lived in Donetsk and worked for a good eight months.

Then, I wrote a book on Ukrainian democracy and why it struck me. Because it’s the most democratic country in the former Soviet Union. I mean, despite everything, all the problems facing Ukraine, despite Russian aggression, it’s remained remarkably democratic, even, I would say, to a remarkable degree during wartime.

Brian Bonner: What’s the scope of the Ukrainian studies program and its popularity? Has that changed during the war?

Lucan Way: Yeah, certainly. There’s a massive Ukrainian diaspora that supports the program. We have always had a lot of Ukrainian programming, but that obviously stepped up enormously during the full-scale invasion. We’ve had webinars—I had almost two a week at the start—and there’s been a tremendous amount of interest.

But now we’ve also developed some academic programs. I’m happy about a non-residential scholar program. Initially, the idea was that we needed to bring scholars to safety. However, Ukrainians want to stay in Ukraine and help out the country. My goal is to fund Ukrainians who want to stay here and fight but also allow them to do academic work.

We use Zoom to have seminars and hear about really fantastic research. So that’s one thing. Then, we also have the Munk School, which has a program with the Kyiv School of Economics. It’s so inspiring. We brought over master’s students, and we just had a policy brief competition with Ukrainian master’s students on issues critical to Ukraine.

Brian Bonner: So all the teaching and learning only happens in Toronto? Are we talking about hundreds or thousands of students? I’m curious about how wildly popular this is.

Lucan Way: Not thousands. I would say there’s a good cohort, you know, 50-60 students, very interested in Ukraine. Interest in Ukraine was really high at the beginning of the war because people were so shocked by the atrocities. And I think the interest was sustained for a much longer time than I thought. I thought Ukraine fatigue would set in much earlier.

The victories, the fact that Ukraine could push back Moscow from the Kyiv region, and the success in the counteroffensive in Kharkiv and then Kherson kept up the interest in Ukraine. With the difficulties in the more recent counteroffensive that didn’t go as well as some had hoped, there is a little bit of Ukraine fatigue, especially in the United States.

Ukrainian experience: What can you learn from this country?

Brian Bonner: We’re in the middle of a life-and-death drama, so it never gets boring. Professor Way is the author or co-author of at least three books, including one that I’m reading on the way over here: “Pluralism by Default: Weak Autocrats and the Rise of Competitive Politics.” He also has two more books along those lines, I guess, with his co-writing partner, Steve Levitsky.

Lucan Way: Right.

Brian Bonner: The professor studies global trends in democracy and dictatorship. I read enough of the book, including all the Ukraine sections, to know that he knows quite a lot about Ukraine. He’s here for four lectures. I attended one at the Kyiv School of Economics, but he had three others at Kyiv Mohyla Academy and other places.

Now, professors like to teach, but this is not your first trip here. You’ve been here many times, and you have lived here, but this is your first trip here since 2018. You said it’s been six years.

Lucan Way: It was 2018, yeah.

Brian Bonner: Professors also learn. What did you learn on this trip?

Lucan Way: I wanted to come. My family was a little resistant; I have two 12-year-old boys. It’s so inspiring to come here. First of all, the level of sanity in this place is just remarkable, given what people here are up against with these air raid sirens at 3 a.m. every night and stuff. I think most people would go insane. Compared to the United States, it’s a striking contrast.

I was here in the 1990s. I lived near Palace Ukraine, right in the center of Kyiv. Society has changed so dramatically since then that I’m struck by the level of innovation. Take a place like the Kyiv School of Economics. Timothy Mylovanov has just put it all together. He’s gotten generators, classrooms, and shelters so they can teach under any circumstances. Just the level of resourcefulness, people should come here to learn resilience.

Brian Bonner: We could do tourism and promote tourism.

Lucan Way: That’s like Chornobyl, but it’s much less dangerous. It is truly inspiring. And it feels like such a young country, too, with this kind of energy; it’s remarkable. The last six months have been a hard time, and it’s far from being a heady day. Of course, I think the view of Zelensky has kind of shifted a bit. But still, even in this context, I think the fact that people are not just surviving but still kind of thriving is remarkable.

Brian Bonner: Well, you came here during their morale boost of the US finally approving (a $60 billion military aid package – ed.).

Lucan Way: I was on the train. I heard the news; our entire train was a “hurrah.” That was such a relief.

Brian Bonner: Now, I think we can stay in the fight for at least a year.

Lucan Way: I think for longer. It’s a bit worrisome, but for now, the $60 billion is a good chunk of change.

Why did Russia invade Ukraine?

Brian Bonner: I want to ask you if you have an analysis of why Russia invaded Ukraine full-scale. Is it because Ukraine was becoming too strong as a society and a democracy, or was it too weak and considered easy picking? Or was it none of the above and just the imperial impulse?

Lucan Way: I used to have a lot of Russian friends until they supported the war. What always struck me was that many of the Russians have relatives here (in Ukraine – ed.), and they have no idea about Ukraine. The first time it struck me was during the Orange Revolution (2004 protests in Ukraine against a rigged presidential election – ed.) I was in Moscow with an old friend, and he was like: «you know, he’s a «fascist» (the then-leader of opposition and later President Viktor Yushchenko – ed.)». I’m like: «what are you talking about?» I mean, he’s the mildest-mannered guy, and he’s not a fascist.

They think they understand Ukraine, but they don’t. What happened to Vladimir Putin? He just had the (Russian Federal Security Service) FSB do these pollings of Ukrainian public opinion. It turned out that (President Volodymyr) Zelensky, as we all know, was not very popular at the time. Putin was a very good picker, so he saw Ukraine as weak and corrupt. He shared all the stereotypes that everybody else has in the West about Ukraine being corrupt.

So I think it was really because he thought there were easy pickings. The other important thing is that he saw Europe as weak and divided. The narrative on the left in the United States is that NATO was too threatening, but the reality is that it was perceived as too weak. It’s the opposite; it’s the weakness of the West and the perceived weakness of Ukraine, which was wrong, that led him to invade.

Brian Bonner: Isn’t it amazing that a neighbor who shares so many ties can get it so wrong?

Lucan Way: It’s actually sort of interesting, almost psychologically. But there really is a deep-seated dismissal of Ukraine as provincial. They just have no idea what it’s like.

Political transformation of Ukraine

Brian Bonnerl: You say you’ve been here since the 1980s when you were in the Soviet Union.

Lucan Way: I was a student in Moscow, and I stayed at the Lybid Hotel in April 1989. Shcherbytsky (Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, head of Ukraine under the Soviet Union in 1972-1989—ed.) was still in power; he was a tough guy. That was a period when Moscow was much more open and optimistic, and Ukraine felt kind of dead. My good friend, Chrystia Freeland, is now the deputy minister of Canada; she was here as a student.

Brian Bonner: You’ve seen a lot of transitions since then, and I want to ask you about that. I don’t know what label you want to use. I mean, are we an unconsolidated democracy, a fragile democracy, or a developing democracy? You certainly wouldn’t have put Ukraine in the autocracy category.

Lucan Way: There’s a big asterisk because you can’t have elections, so that’s clear. But what’s remarkable and what people don’t quite realize? Elections are one part of democracy; there’s also the legislature, there’s also the media. Given the fact that Ukraine is facing an existential threat, it would be easy to justify very autocratic measures in Ukraine because the threat is real. This is not a made-up stuff. Yet the level of openness is just remarkable, given the mobilization and the number of amendments.

Can Zelensky become a dictator?

Brian Bonner: We’re in a state of martial law, and this invests tremendous power in the government, which can be abused. Now, your book is very interesting because you go from Kravchuk (Leonid Kravchuk, the first president of independent Ukraine – ed.) to the presidents and point out the mistakes they made and why they lost.

I don’t need to tell you that Ukrainians are more than happy to vote people out of office. And do, because we don’t know the outcome of our elections, that’s what makes them elections. What dangers does Zelensky have to avoid when he’s leading a country at war, and should people be afraid that he’s not going to want to give up these powers?

Lucan Way: I think you should. It doesn’t matter who the leader is; you should always be afraid that they’re not going to give up power. Anybody who’s hubristic or self-confident enough to think they could be president of an entire country is never going to want to give it up. That’s the essence of politics, and he’s, I’m sure, no different from anybody else.

But within Ukraine, there are enormous constraints because you have a very strong civil society. Also, this is less intuitive: His party is quite weak and fractious. I guess that it’ll follow the British trajectory, when (Winston) Churchill led Great Britain during the war (World War Ii), and then he was voted out after the war.

Brian Bonner: Yeah, we still need a well-developed party system. They revolve around personalities rather than ideologies, structure, or tradition.

Lucan Way: Ironically, that helps democracy. When you have a cohesive political party, people follow the leader. But in this kind of party, you have members of Zelensky’s party who are effectively in opposition, and so that actually helps pluralism. That’s the irony, and that’s the point of my book.

Brian Bonner: It’s a fascinating discussion and a fascinating book. I recommend that people check him out. Just go on YouTube, and you’ll see Lucan Way, his presentations, and a lot of issues.

Democracy vs Dictatorship: Global Trends

Brian Bonner: Do you think Ukraine will emerge from this stronger or weaker?

Lucan Way: Unfortunately, a lot of that depends on things that are totally outside of Ukraine’s control, which is the American Congress. And that’s the ultimate tragedy. The next election in my home country, the United States, is existential for us, but for Ukraine, it really is existential.

Brian Bonner: Is there a global trend in democracy and dictatorship? And because of the situation in Ukraine, what is the potential for either to dominate? People paint pretty bleak pictures if Russia wins this thing.

Lucan Way: I think that’s definitely a danger, but I don’t think Russia will ever win for the simple reason that you can’t win a colonial war. This is a colonial war. No one’s won a colonial war; there have been one or two examples in a hundred years. In Ukraine, it won’t be pretty, and there will be a lot of death and destruction, but the Ukrainians are never going to do what they’re told under Putin.

Brian Bonner: Does democracy need Ukraine to win, to flourish?

Lucan Way: The point of my book is that I think democracy is certainly in crisis, especially in the United States. At the same time, if you look at broader democracy, it is doing shockingly well. In the 1990s, democracy went way up. It spread enormously, in large part because of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States was the only superpower, Russia was in disarray, and China was still relatively underdeveloped.

Of course, since the 2000s, China has become a major global power. Given that liberal dominance created a dramatic expansion in democracies, you might think that reducing dominance would lead to a dramatic decline in democracy. But that actually hasn’t happened. About half of the countries in the world are democratic.

Brian Bonner: And there are many elements to democracy. Do you go with the Freedom House standard?

Lucan Way: I think they all revolve around very similar things: free and fair elections, allowing the opposition to criticize the government, and organizing speeches. There are a hundred different measures, but no matter what measure you use, democracy has not actually declined dramatically. Even since the financial crisis of 2008, people have talked about the decline in democracy.

You should look at the numbers; they are quite stable. The reason for that, and this is the point of the new book I’m writing with Steven Levitsky, is that the world has become much richer and more urban and developed in the last 50 years. The irony is that even though the international environment has worsened enormously and you have the rise of authoritarian populists, the domestic structural conditions of the economy, the fact that capitalism has spread has actually given quite a healthy basis for democratic politics.

Brian Bonner: Are those prerequisites for democracy? Education, affluence?

Lucan Way: It’s pretty essential. We argue that having a system of private property and a strong, robust private sector is essential because to have a democracy, you need opposition, and to have opposition, they need money. If the state controls all the money, they’ll never get it because the government won’t give it to them. So you need the private sector to give them money. So, the irony is that the neoliberal reform of the 1990s helped democracy in many ways. In the developing world especially.

Brian Bonner: Are you of the school that says there are universal human rights and people have this universal desire for freedom, justice, and economic sustainability, or do you believe that there are cultural reasons why democracies tend not to flourish in the Middle East or Africa, among other places?

Lucan Way: I don’t go for cultural arguments. Look at a place like Kuwait; before it discovered oil, it was quite pluralistic. It wasn’t a democracy, but power had to be shared between the king and a merchant class, and it had a pretty robust civil society. When oil was discovered, suddenly, about five guys got control of massive resources, and everybody was dependent on them. Guess what? You have an autocracy.

So it’s not about culture; it’s about control over resources and the bucks, in a sense. That’s what matters. This is why state control of the economy is so bad for democracy; that’s why you need a private sector. You need autonomy from the state more than anything else, and then you also need to be rich because if you’re rich, many people have resources.

Take a country like Romania. For those of you who are old enough to remember Romania in the 1980s, this was not the place you would expect democracy. It was under this Stalinist (Nicolae Ceaușescu – ed.), but now it’s a thriving democracy. It’s remarkable, and I think a large part is because of capitalist development, which has given the opposition access to resources.

Brian Bonner: Does being in the European Union help? To set standards and benchmarks?

Lucan Way: Yeah. But it can’t be just the EU.

Ukraine and Russia: different paths

Brian Bonner: We both had experience in Russia and Ukraine, and bringing it back to the two nations, how did they end up in such different places? Putin’s worldview, he articulated once, is that there are only five independent countries in the world, and the rest are satellites.

Lucan Way: They all miss the “good old days” when the Soviet Union was a world power, and they’re just bitter that that’s gone. Russia just wants to be taken seriously and just can’t handle the fact that people like Ukrainians would have their views on things.

Brian Bonner: Right, they just can’t handle it. He believes he’s a man of the past.

Lucan Way: Look at his speeches; just before the invasion, he had two speeches, on the 21st, 22nd, or 23rd. He’s a self-taught historian. I don’t know what kind of crap he reads. But he wasn’t reading from the prompt; this is a true believer; he believes that Ukraine is not a nation, and he’s just so angry. This is a cranky old man who has so much power.

There are probably a whole bunch of these guys anywhere, but none of them have this kind of power that he has. I’ve spent a lot of time in Russia, and his view of Ukraine is widely shared. Russia went into the war way underprepared.

Is Russia going to collapse?

Brian Bonner: But they learn on the fly, too, and they have the resources to do that. The other thing is, are we in a bubble here in Ukraine? Because we have this wishful thinking: ‘Oh, he’s fragile, he’s going to collapse, and there’s opposition.’

Lucan Way: Actually, that’s interesting. One thing I’ve heard a lot here, which surprises me, is that many people talk about the breakup of Russia. I think that’s a pure fantasy. Many of us remember the fall of the Soviet Union, which collapsed very quickly. But why did it fall? The person at the center of power, (Boris) Yeltsin, in Moscow, wanted it to fall because he wanted to overthrow (Mikhail) Gorbachev.

That’s why it fell so easily. But no one in Moscow will ever support the collapse of Russia. It’s a pure fantasy; we should get over that. I can understand emotionally where that comes from because I would want Russia to disappear, too, if I were living here. But it’s not going to happen.

Brian Bonner: And I don’t know whether you see a way out of it or whether Russia is capable of democracy. And I preface that by saying what I saw in Ukraine from the time I first came in 1996 to now, which is 28 years later. Ukrainians are citizens of the world, literally sometimes. Compared to Russia, they have a much more worldly view. And Russia has just gone down in real isolation.

Lucan Way: It’s true, it’s just so awful. I don’t buy this idea that, culturally, Russians can never be a democracy. The problem is that Putin’s not going anywhere.

Brian Bonner: And he’s quite healthy for his age of 71. Well, that was the other thing we read about.

Lucan Way: That’s all speculation.

Brian Bonner: His health?

Lucan Way: Yeah, we’re all looking at his complexion and hoping. The other thing is reality.

How and why do autocracies succeed or fail?

Brian Bonner: You like to ask big, provocative questions, so I’ll turn it around and ask you: How and why do autocracies succeed or fail? The same goes for democracies because whatever Putin is, he’s a successful autocrat.

Lucan Way: If you had asked anybody, any Russian specialist in 2021, to imagine a scenario where the Russian president goes to war, and thousands of his people die, would Putin survive? You say no way. Putin, before 2022, was incredibly cautious. He invaded Crimea, Georgia in 2008, but he always took over areas that were kind of sympathetic to Russia.

Brian Bonner: He had softened up the ground.

Lucan Way: Yeah, historically, there’s a lot of Russian speakers. But something happened in COVID with him, and then he just does this completely insane thing, just insane on a lot of levels. Yet, after two years, sadly, he is no weaker than he was before. I think that it’s shocking to all of us how strong he is.

Brian Bonner: So, is ruthlessness a part of success for Xi (Jinping) and Putin and the Iranian mullahs?

Lucan Way: Well, part of my argument is that this is another book that just came out in 2022 on revolutionary dictatorships, the social revolution. The revolutions that took place in those years, the revolution in Russia in 1917 and China in 1949, emerged out of violent conflict. That forced them to create these very robust security apparatuses, very robust militaries.

In Iran, you have a Revolutionary Guard, which is incredibly powerful. It emerged out of the Iran-Iraq War. And Russia, of course, is not a revolutionary regime in that sense, but Putin was lucky. He inherited two things from the Soviet era: one is an incredibly weak civil society. 70 years of totalitarianism, which was wiping out any form of Russian civil society that existed, so you had a weak society there. And then he also had an incredibly strong coercive apparatus of the KGB. The world’s strongest coercive apparatus ever.

Russia emerges. It’s an unfair battle because, on one side, you have society, which is just incredibly disorganized, and police, political police, which has all the skills and resources you could imagine.

Brian Bonner: We had that on a smaller scale here in Ukraine. We had Kuchma and Yanukovych, who were aspiring autocrats, and we had the same KGB apparatus. We came to a different place.

Lucan Way: Well, you also had regional divisions, and you had Galicia (western region of Ukraine – ed.).

Brian Bonner: But do you see a strain in Ukrainian history that they are not autocratic? Is it a more democratic, less autocratic culture?

Lucan Way: Well, I don’t know about the culture, but things are more divided regionally. Having the regional divisions, I see that as a big factor. Look at Ukraine before 2014; this part of my book is that you look at turnover; it’s always between a kind of Russophile versus Ukrainophile. There weren’t parties because the parties were very weak, but it was regionalized. And so the voting was always divided.

Brian Bonner: So, if Yanukovych had been a tougher autocrat, we could be living in Putin’s land.

Lucan Way: No, it’s not about toughness. He was tough in February of 2014. But no matter what he did, he couldn’t control the west (of Ukraine). So, large parts of the army just defected.

Brian Bonner: He lost control.

Lucan Way: He lost control, which was inevitable. His mistake was overplaying his hand; he was too tough, the massacre on the Maidan.

Brian Bonner: There are a lot of examples, and you know better than I do, of autocracies that become democracies or arguably democracies. How does that process start? And once you are in that camp, I assume you believe the staying power of democracies depends on quite a few factors.

Lucan Way: In political science, the transition from dictatorship to democracy happens for a whole number of, often completely random, reasons. Why did the transition happen in Eastern Europe? It was mainly because you just had a guy, Gorbachev, come to power who decided he didn’t want Eastern Europe. He didn’t want to expend the resources to keep Eastern Europe in the Soviet sphere. That was just pure luck, and that was kind of random.

Brian Bonner: It was a fortunate stroke of history.

Lucan Way: Yeah, subjective factors. But then the question is, what happens afterward, right? You have Africa; you have transitions. But then, because control over the resources is much more centralized, it’s very easy to return to autocracy. So those places that stay (democratic – ed.) are rich capitalist countries like South Korea. Actually, among the high-income countries in the world, not including oil cases, 97% of them are democracies. The only exceptions are Hungary and Singapore. So it’s, as I say in social science, both necessary and probably sufficient for the rest of the world. But to become a democracy is to be a rich capitalist.

Another book in progress

Brian Bonner: All right, that’s another great reason for prosperity and sharing of the resources. Well, we would take hours more if we talked about Canadian and American politics. We should probably wrap it up and leave it there because I know you’re here on a short-time schedule. You’ve got a lot of things to do and a lot of people to see. But when is your next book? When do you hope to have that out?

Lucan Way: About a year.

Brian Bonner: With your partner, how does that work? He writes a chapter, you write a chapter, or you just edit each other?

Lucan Way: No, we’re just very good friends. We write different chapters together, but we almost always agree.

Brian Bonner: In the same space, that’s great. Well, that’s why he’s your partner. And the solo book, that was a good experience without your partner?

Lucan Way: That was my kind of heart and soul. That was from years of living in Moscow in 1991.

Brian Bonner: Yeah, you took it. I recommend this book, “Pluralism by Default: Weak Autocrats and the Rise of Competitive Politics.” It’s a really good book. I look forward to the other two with your partner, too.

For them, people are a propaganda tool: the story of a civilian hostage Oleh Bohdanov

Oleh Bohdanov, a civilian hostage of the Russians, previously served as the deputy head of one of the departments of the Kherson City Council. He was abducted in Kherson during the summer of 2022 amid the occupation.

«He risked his life to get people out»

Oleksandr Tarasov: The article attributed to Oleh by the Russians is very serious. His relatives and lawyers hope that by not drawing too much attention to this case, they will be able to reduce the sentence. As for Oleh’s story, despite holding a public office, he did not seek any fame; instead, he focused on solving specific issues.

I knew Oleh before these events. He was very surprised to see me in SIZO No. 1 in Kherson. We stayed in the same cell for several days until Oleh was extradited to Lefortovo, and the case of so-called international terrorism began. They try to talk about this case very carefully due to fear of harm.

Oleh endured the torture chamber of the temporary detention center in Kherson. He knew he was being taken to Crimea. During our time in the cell with him, he exhibited a sense of anticipation and a certain fear of what would happen next. He recounted being tortured and abused in the detention center, mentioning that his kidneys were nearly shattered and he was subjected to electric shocks.

Oleh is a deeply patriotic person, dedicated to his work. He implemented essential reforms in the city’s transportation sector, even confronting the Kherson transport mafia, which led to significant conflicts.

From the first day of the full-scale invasion, he began volunteering and delivering humanitarian aid. As the occupation expanded and intensified, he demonstrated fearlessness, venturing out under fire to procure and deliver medicines and essential equipment for medical workers. He also evacuated people on a voluntary basis, despite coming under fire multiple times.

I talked about Oleh on my interview when I first came out from illegal detention. I received letters from people whom he had rescued and evacuated. They expressed deep gratitude to Oleh and asked how they could assist him. He risked his life to save people.


Read also: How the Moscow Mechanism will help release illegally detained civilians


«The issue of release should be addressed comprehensively»

Oleksandr Tarasov: I am in contact with Oleh Bogdanov’s relatives. They are bewildered and unsure of what steps to take in this situation. With a criminal case against him and his registration in all registers, they are uncertain about what to do next and how to proceed, considering the potential consequences. Fear is prevalent among them.

I maintain contact with the relatives of everyone who was detained with me and those from whom I have received communication. The matter of their release is complex and requires a comprehensive approach. Returning these individuals without international pressure and action will be challenging. Regarding Oleh, his name is gaining recognition, and I consistently highlight it in my reports and appeals to international organizations and institutions.

His current challenge lies in securing effective legal representation. Although he has a lawyer appointed to him, it’s understood that this representation is inadequate.

Communicating with Oleh is challenging. While we can send letters, not everything is permitted by the censors.


Read also: Political sponsor for those illegally imprisoned by the Russians — explains the wife of the civilian hostage


«For them, people are a tool of internal propaganda plus a tool of pressure»

Oleksandr Tarasov: There are nine people involved in the case. They are all facing charges related to an alleged sabotage group attempting to assassinate occupation officials. Additionally, it’s worth noting that all confessions were obtained through torture and beatings. They were also coerced into filming propaganda videos, which were aired, falsely claiming that they had captured a group of international terrorists.

I find the article confusing. Even if we were to assume that all the accusations made by the Russians were true, their actions wouldn’t meet the criteria for terrorism. These individuals are Ukrainian citizens, and it’s their constitutional duty to defend their country. International terrorism typically involves committing violent acts to achieve political goals. If they were to establish this as the motive, these individuals should be treated as prisoners of war.

This case is ostentatious. I’m truly sorry for the individuals who got caught up in it. It appears that the Russians arbitrarily selected these individuals to label them as international terrorists.

This is a recurring pattern with them. Take the case of Konstyantyn Zinovkin from occupied Melitopol, for instance. He vanished, leaving his wife unaware of his whereabouts or activities. Then, suddenly, a propaganda video emerges claiming that the FSB has uncovered a network of Ukrainian saboteurs in Melitopol, implicating him.

For them, people are a tool of internal propaganda plus a tool of pressure.

Oleh was not acquainted with all the other members of the group. What he is acused of is that alegedly one member would contact him, and his task was to provide them with explosives. However, there is no evidence or witness account confirming the existence or whereabouts of these explosives. It’s crucial to note that all confessions were coerced through torture.

He was detained in full view of his 5-year-old son, who witnessed the distressing scene as his father was grabbed and arrested. The ordeal continued as he was subjected to physical assault and had a gun pointed at him. It was only through considerable effort that he managed to convince the occupiers to contact his ex-wife so she could take care of the child. The entire experience was undoubtedly traumatic for the child.

There is no humanity in them. Take the case of Mykyta Chebotar, who was detained along with his 85-year-old grandmother. When the occupiers discovered Ukrainian content on her phone, they subjected her to brutal beatings, threats, and even fired a shot over her head. These horrific acts underscore Russia’s status as a bona fide terrorist state.

It seems that Oleh drew the occupiers’ attention due to his active involvement in patriotic volunteer work. His efforts included evacuating Ukrainians from the occupied territory and openly expressing his opposition to the occupation. Additionally, as an official of the city council, he refused to comply with certain agreements. Notably, he declined an offer from Kirill Stremousov (Ukrainian pro-Russian collaborator -ed.) to join the civil-military Kherson regional administration as the head of the transport department.


Read also: Helping civilians in illegal detention and their families — NGO «Egida-Zaporizhzhia»


Forecasts on the case

Oleksandr Tarasov: Oleh remains hopeful for an exchange. However, according to various sources, including the Coordination Headquarters, it’s unlikely that he will be returned until a verdict is reached. It’s believed that the authorities need to fabricate a verdict to portray them as terrorists.

The future remains uncertain. What’s certain is that the Russians will likely keep the individuals detained for another year and a half. After that period, the situation may become clearer. There’s a possibility they could be repatriated, but unfortunately, there’s also the chance they could be transferred to a penal colony. Either way, the fight for their freedom will continue.


Read also: The «Chameleon» — a course about avoiding captivity and the psychology of survival in captivity


In times of war, the program «Free our relatives» tells the stories of people, cities, villages, and entire regions that have been captured by Russian invaders. We discuss the war crimes committed by the Kremlin and its troops against the Ukrainian people.

The program is hosted by Ihor Kotelyanets and Anastasia Bagalika.


This publication is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the framework of the Human Rights in Action Program implemented by Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union. Opinions, conclusions and recommendations presented in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID, the United States Government. The contents are the responsibility of the authors.

USAID is the world’s premier international development agency and a catalytic actor driving development results. USAID’s work demonstrates American generosity, and promotes a path to recipient self-reliance and resilience, and advances U.S. national security and economic prosperity. USAID has partnered with Ukraine since 1992, providing more than $9 billion in assistance. USAID’s current strategic priorities include strengthening democracy and good governance, promoting economic development and energy security, improving health care systems, and mitigating the effects of the conflict in the east.

For additional information about USAID in Ukraine, please call USAID’s Development Outreach and Communications Office at: +38 (044) 521-5753. You may also visit our website: http://www.usaid.gov/ukraine or our Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/USAIDUkraine.

Corruption, attacks on civil society and dishonest officials. How can Ukraine fight all that?

Brian Bonner: Hello, everybody. This is Brian Bonner, and I’m welcoming you to Hromadske Radio’s Ukraine Calling. And thank you, our listeners and viewers around the world. This is going to be a very enchanting program. We have bad news on the weather and the war front, unfortunately, but the bright spot is the presence of Daria Kaleniuk in the studio. Hi, Daria.

Daria Kaleniuk: Good to be here. Thank you for inviting me.

What’s the issue with seizing Russia’s frozen assets?

Brian Bonner: And if this conversation sounds like one between two longtime friends, it is. We’ve known each other for a long time. She is the executive director of the Anti-Corruption Action Centre and more. Ukrainska Pravda named her one of the 100 most powerful and influential women in Ukraine. Definitely, she’s in the top 100.

She’s also been a reliable part of this vast network of civil society, one of Ukraine’s strengths. So before we get into the corruption part and the war on corruption, maybe you can talk about your organization. How has it changed from the war? I know you’ve been campaigning actively for “Make Russia Pay.” I believe there are $360 billion in Russian assets frozen around the world, mostly in Europe.

Before today, I read the news that the G7 finance ministers are meeting in Italy, and they’re again dancing around this issue: Russia’s war is illegal, their seizure of territory is illegal, they’re committing war crimes – that’s illegal. They’re destroying property – that’s illegal. And yet, why is it that the international community is tying themselves up in knots about whether seizing the assets is legal or not? You’re a lawyer, please enlighten me.

Daria Kaleniuk: As a lawyer, I would like to say that lawyers shouldn’t resolve this issue. The issue of seizing Russian assets should be resolved by politicians and leaders. Because actually, the law follows the realities, the geopolitical situation. The international law basics were designed after World War II after tens of millions of people were slaughtered. And this caused a setup of new rules. Now we have another tipping point in international relations – the genocidal war happening in Ukraine by Russia.

Russia is partnering with other autocracies, Iran, China, and North Korea. Russia is bringing soldiers and troops from all across the world. Even some people from Africa are now earning money serving in the Russian armed forces and participating in this genocide.

Brian Bonner: And Sri Lanka and other places.

Daria Kaleniuk: And India and many, many other places. We might not know everything, but the point is that it’s not just some local small conflict or just the Ukrainian war, as many media outlets are still portraying it. It’s actually a tipping point in the way the world will develop, whether autocracy will win or democracy, whether the liberal world will still exist. Ukraine is just the battlefield for all of that.

It means that the current set of rules, which sometimes include specific frameworks for lawyers, financial experts, and technical people, is outdated. They have to be put aside, and politicians, leaders who actually represent the will of the people and who have to respond to the challenges, must redesign new rules. And that is not actually new rules if we are talking about the confiscation of Russian sovereign assets.

Brian Bonner: It’s been done before, Iraq. They invaded Kuwait.

Daria Kaleniuk: Even the existing legal framework more or less gives tools for how to get it done.

Brian Bonner: And why are they holding this up? Is it because they want to do business as usual with Russia?

Daria Kaleniuk: They are too afraid, I think. Some still think that they can go back to business as usual. But they are also influenced by some companies. First of all, there is a huge company called Euroclear. It’s a Belgian financial institution, a European Union clearing center, I would say, which holds most of the seized and arrested money. It’s about 191 billion euros, merely Russian sovereign money.

They were frozen in 2022. This institution is earning huge profits from this money. In two years, they earned more than 5 billion euros. This institution is represented by its CEO. It’s a woman—I don’t remember her last name—but she is now on her tour across Europe. She is spreading fears among the leaders, financial experts, and financial ministers, saying that, oh my God, if you seize Russian sovereign money, the entire financial system of the EU will collapse.

Also, this institution goes to the office of the prime minister of Belgium and says: we are a critically important institution for you. We cannot be forced to seize these assets, it’s unprecedented. Too many risks to us, you know. Tomorrow Russia will go to all the courts in the world and we will have to spend zillions of euros in order to protect ourselves.

This is absolute bullshit. We tried to figure out how many lawsuits Russia submitted against Euroclear and where. What they were able to tell us, it’s just a few in Russia. Who cares about the lawsuits in Russia? Are there courts in Russia?

Brian Bonner: Well, we have lawyers too or the West has lawyers too. And I would not want to be in Russia’s position if we battled it. But the problem with lawsuits, as you know, is they take a long time. Sort of like our criminal investigations here. But do you see a breakthrough imminent, or are they just going to keep fighting? Do you agree that we’re going to need this money? Because it looks like the West is flagging in its support of Ukraine.

Daria Kaleniuk: The West cannot suggest an alternative. If you don’t want to confiscate these $300 billion, which are placed in Belgium, France, a little bit in Germany, and Japan, if you guys are not ready to confiscate, what is the alternative? Are you ready to generate $300 billion for Ukraine? To arm Ukraine? I don’t see that kind of readiness. There was quite a battle to get an EU-approved Ukraine peace facility, which is 50 billion or so.

Brian Bonner: Over the four years.

Daria Kaleniuk: Yeah, over the four years. Two-thirds of these are actually loans. And not a single euro can be spent on defense. So how can we defend ourselves? Where should we get the money to pay our military? Where should we get the money to buy weapons if we are not given assistance from that?

And there is money that Russia keeps in Europe. So we are saying: all right, you don’t have the money, you are taxpayers. Okay, fair enough. You have more important things to spend on. You can’t increase the prices of electricity, etc. But you are sitting on Russian money, you are earning on Russian money, you are war profiteering.

So, the first step that the European Commission will be taking in June is to take profits earned by European institutions on Russian sovereign frozen money and spend them on Ukraine. But they don’t want to take profits earned by Euroclear in 2022-2023. And what’s the reason for that?

Brian Bonner: That’s $5 billion in interest, it’s about $5 billion.

Daria Kaleniuk: It’s between $3 to $5 billion.

Brian Bonner: But as Timothy Ash says, that doesn’t even touch the sides of what Ukraine needs. And they won’t even do that.

Daria Kaleniuk: It doesn’t even challenge any legal international issues. This money doesn’t belong to Russia. They belong for some reason to Euroclear, which earns this money on the blood of Ukrainians.

Brian Bonner: The ultimate war profiteering.

Daria Kaleniuk: It is war profiteering. We initially came to Belgium and reached a high governmental level, and we told them. They said: no sorry, we will not change our mind, we want to keep this money and you will not convince us. And we said: oh really? You don’t know about Ukrainian civil society. Your decision is not known to your parliament, to your civil society. We will make sure that everybody knows about that.

Ukrainian civil society does its part in winning the war

Brian Bonner: You have a formidable group of allies. And a powerful group of allies. Because I know a lot of them. Is that your number one priority? Your number one war priority?

Daria Kaleniuk: We have a few teams. The Anticorruption Action Centre focuses on reforms inside Ukraine and the confiscation of Russian assets. After the large-scale invasion, we set up the International Center for Ukrainian Victory, which focuses more on international advocacy and advocating for everything Ukraine needs to win the war.

Brian Bonner: That came from ANTAC, it came from the coalition?

Daria Kaleniuk: ANTAC is one of the co-founders, with a few more organizations and support. So, Ukrainian civil society groups are joining efforts. My main job is as an anti-corruption activist in Ukraine. I’m building the rule of law.

Brian Bonner: But IF we don’t have a country, we don’t have any corruption to fight.

Daria Kaleniuk: That’s the point. We will fix our corruption and keep our democracy in good shape. But if ballistic missiles and guided bombs rain down every day, it’s hard to build democracy.

Does the West really support Ukraine?

Brian Bonner: I had two guests, Ben Hodges and Kurt Volker. You know both of them. They basically say the fundamental problem is that the West hasn’t decided that it wants Ukraine to win this war. Do you agree?

Daria Kaleniuk: I agree. But I see that slowly, at least our European allies are waking up. So they start to understand what is the alternative. If Ukraine is not winning this war, what’s then? Peace negotiations? Well, I don’t know. But I see more and more people trying to understand that it is unlikely there will be any sustainable peace.

More and more people are starting to understand, even among leaders, that peace in Russian conditions means more war in the future. Including war against NATO directly. That is a good trajectory. But still, if you look at (German Chancellor Olaf) Scholz and Germany, while Germany is number two after America in the amount of military aid provided to Ukraine, it is still self-deterring. Scholz is afraid to send Taurus to Ukraine, because, oh my God, Ukraine can destroy the Kerch bridge.

Brian Bonner: They have 600 of those Taurus sitting around too.

Daria Kaleniuk: And also when (U.S. national security adviser Jake) Sullivan comes to Ukraine and says: ‘Don’t strike on Russian oil refineries. What are you doing, bad Ukrainians?’ We are not provided with military aid for seven months and “you dare to strike Russian oil refineries.” And we are responding, okay where are your grave sanctions? The grave sanction was actually Ukraine striking those oil refineries and preventing more oil from Russia from being sold. And more money coming to the Russian military budget to buy more weapons to destroy more Ukrainians.

Brian Bonner: Well let’s hope the momentum starts going our way again, Ukraine’s way again. One big start would be the $60 billion and another big start would be if Europe does wake up. And you’re right, I am seeing signs that they are. They’ve been a pretty defenseless continent for too long. But I think with the prospect of Donald Trump returning to the White House they don’t have a choice except to actually shoulder more of the burden themselves.

Ukrainians and you and the civil society activists have done a great job of explaining why you can’t negotiate with Russia, I think. I mean, how many agreements has Russia broken? Virtually all of them, I think. I don’t think there’s any that they’ve upheld. So that’s a no-go zone for the world, I think.

And for all the Ukraine haters and those who are looking for reasons not to help Ukraine, we talk about corruption because we love Ukraine and we believe that corruption is stealing from the future of Ukraine and stealing from the prosperity of Ukraine. And there’s a big difference between a democratic society like Ukraine which is exposing corruption, fighting it, developing ways to prevent and punish it, and a complete criminal mafia state like Russia, which doesn’t even bother. And actually exports corruption, death, and destruction all over the world. Did I say that correctly?

Daria Kaleniuk: Beautifully said. I have nothing to add.

How is the fight against corruption in Ukraine going?

Brian Bonner: I am trying to catch up and I am losing track of all the corruption scandals. So I guess I’ll just throw it out generally. Where are we at now in the battle against corruption, in the war against corruption, which is an internal war for every country, including America? I think the most appalling corruption during times of war would be in defense or defense procurements.

Daria Kaleniuk: I would add one more thing to your explanation of the problem of corruption. Corruption was and still is a very important tool in the hands of the Kremlin. It is called strategic corruption when they are using their agents of influence when they are bribing politicians, when they are installing their politicians, political and media projects all across the world.

They do this in order to destroy some countries from the inside, as they have already done successfully with Belarus. Or in order to control the narratives in some countries like they are doing in Hungary. In Ukraine, they have tried hard to use corruption to destroy Ukraine from the inside without having to actually go to war.

There were attempts to change our legislation through the Constitutional Court. They have invested hard into the political project of Viktor Medvedchuk, a former so-called “leader of the opposition.” They have wired him millions and millions of dollars from Russia, generated from piping oil and gas.

The media projects. There were three national TV channels in 2019, in 2021, controlled by Medvedchuk, which spread Kremlin propaganda. But they failed in their attempts to take control of Ukraine just by using corruption and other means. Why have they failed? Because we were actually quite successful in building independent institutions, a system of checks and balances. Ukrainian civil society is strong.

And in Ukraine, there emerged politicians and government officials, not all of them, but many, who are actually true patriots of the country, who tried to do things right. And that actually made (Vladimir) Putin very nervous. And he decided, okay, I can’t control you like I control Belarus, I will throw hundreds, thousands of my soldiers, thousands of missiles and bombs. I will just destroy you. And you will give up.

No. We are not giving up. Even during this large-scale invasion, we are not giving up in our consistent fight against corruption and building strong democratic institutions and systems of checks and balances. It’s quite unique to the world.

Including the defense sector, I would say even most important. Unfortunately, it was our mistake, and our team, the Anticorruption Action Centre, as well, to not look into the defense sector for 12 years when we were operating.

Brian Bonner: Since the revolution.

Daria Kaleniuk: Even before the Revolution of Dignity (in 2013-2014). Since the Revolution of Dignity, there have been many reforms in the healthcare sector, the educational sector, the environmental sector, and even in the energy sector. But almost zero reforms in the Ministry of Defense. There have been some important positive changes in the army, in armed forces, because many volunteers after Maidan, straight from the Revolution of Dignity, volunteered to fight against Russian aggression. It started not two years ago, but 10 years ago in 2014.

But the Ministry of Defense, procurements, the way these people are appointed to different positions, and the way the defense production sector operates—everything was super post-Soviet. It was super closed from the eyes of outsiders and from the eyes of civil society. It’s national security; security has to be there. But not everything should be top-state secret.

There’s also complexity because defense, especially if you’re talking about arms, is complex. So, probably, arms transfers and arms procurements are the most complicated. We can probably compare this kind of procurement to healthcare and medical procurements. You have to understand that market. But in Ukraine, those who understood that market were post-Soviet people, whom we inherited from the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Former directors of defense companies who, for the last 35 years, have been actually selling the old Soviet junk weapons all across the world. And we were serving weapons that we sold to different countries in the world, repairing these weapons. And now, after the large-scale invasion, the system had to change the way it operates.

Instead of selling junk stuff that we inherited from the Soviet Union, we had to buy it. And not just junk and not just Soviet, but actually NATO standard equipment. And that changes the entire framework of how MOD (the Ministry of Defense) should operate. New people have to come there, people who are not thinking in Soviet style. We have to build trust into the system so that Western partners – especially those countries and companies that produce weapons – have trust. Whatever they sell to Ukraine, the technology is being protected. And that the bribe will not be required. And we’ve raised that issue super high. By exposing a year ago corruption in procurements of food. It’s not a weapon, it’s just food.

Brian Bonner: But that triggered the ouster of (ex-Defense Minister Oleksiy) Reznikov.

Daria Kaleniuk: That triggered important changes, Reznikov was fired. Unfortunately, with a delay, just in September 2023. The new minister was appointed, (Rustem) Umerov, who actually started the cleanup of the defense procurements. And now we have two agencies. Agency on non-lethal procurements under Arsen Zhumadilov, a known reformer who previously cleaned the system of medical procurements. And just recently, there was appointed the new head of the defense procurement agency.

Brian Bonner: From Ukrenergo she was.

Daria Kaleniuk: She is from Ukrenergo and she is one of the best procurers in the country. She received a few awards from Prozorro (electronic system of public procurement – ed.) for how she does procurements.

Brian Bonner: So are you saying you have faith? That we’re on the way to recovery here?

Daria Kaleniuk: I’m saying we don’t have any other choice and any other option. I’m saying that our team now has a crystal clear focus to make sure that things will be repaired. Especially in lethal procurements.

What is the scale of corruption in defense procurements?

Brian Bonner: Do we have any way of knowing the scale of corruption in defense procurements? There are massive amounts of equipment and money involved. Procurements go on a scale that Ukraine has never done before.

Daria Kaleniuk: Well, first of all, it is important to separate. Whatever corruption is happening in the defense procurements in Ukraine, this is our taxpayers’ money. Because we are not allowed to buy weapons or spend anything on defense from the money that is coming from our partners. It is both good and bad. The good thing is, that American taxpayers can be relaxed. European taxpayers can feel safe that whatever money is being sent to Ukraine, they are not being embezzled in the defense procurements. This is the first thing.

Second, we want American money, EU money, and first of all confiscated Russian money to come to Ukraine, to be spent in Ukraine, and to be used by defense procurement agencies to purchase weapons. This is the road to sustainability. We have to be able to purchase what we need ourselves in Ukraine. We shouldn’t be dependent on what’s on the minds of Mike Johnson, Donald Trump, Olaf Scholz, or whoever.

We have to be leaders in our country. We also need to have the resources and capabilities to buy weapons from our producers. Amazing solutions emerged in the defense industry in Ukraine, especially among private inventors who cooperate with the army. This drone industry includes small drones, big drones, long-range drones, drones that are hitting oil reserves in Russia, and drones that are hitting the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. All of that is designed and produced in Ukraine by Ukrainians on the money that Ukrainian taxpayers paid.

So we have to scale that up. We know that we will be able to do that if our procurement institutions in the defense industry are more effective. We will get rid of notorious people whom we don’t trust and who probably have a background of sympathizing with Russia. That network of people has not been cleared yet from the industry. And we just don’t have another option; we have to get it done now.

Brian Bonner: During the war?

Daria Kaleniuk: Yes.

Does Volodymy Zelensky want to fight corruption?

Brian Bonner: At the heart of the matter is intent. Mykhailo Zhernakov, head of the DEJURE Foundation, said it aptly: We have not had governments that wanted the rule of law, an independent judiciary, a real fight against corruption, and swift and sure justice. Do we have that now in the Zelensky administration?

Daria Kaleniuk: There are many people in the Zelensky administration who want to get it done right. But I also see many people who don’t want it. And there is a conflict between them. The question is whether Zelensky wants to get it done right. And I don’t have a clear answer. I see that Zelensky really wants to get Ukraine into the EU and NATO. And this is a very positive sign, this means that whatever reforms regarding the rule of law are listed in the conditionals on the way to the EU and NATO, they will be implemented.

We’ve already witnessed that when in June 2022, the European Commission told, us that we are ready to issue you the status of candidate country to the EU, but first implement seven conditions. Five of them were about the rule of law. Constitutional court reboot, then the appointment of the specialized corruption prosecutor, anti-money laundering legislation. All seven were done. And in November 2023 we got very positive feedback from the European Commission. And then the European Commission issued a report highlighting what else has to be done.

I hope that in June, we will finally open negotiations between Ukraine and the European Union about membership. These negotiations will start from chapters 23-24. These are the fundamentals of the European Union accession track. They concern the need to reform all law enforcement agencies, prosecution, police, security services, the State Bureau of Investigation, and the Bureau of Economic Security.

Attacks on civil society in Ukraine

Brian Bonner: We have a lot to talk about here. We have had some problems lately. There have been attacks on members of civil society, investigative journalists, and SBU video recording members of the Bihus Info. In a time of war, they actually have time to harass journalists and civil society activists. What is going on, who’s behind it, and how widespread is this? And has it stopped, or will it stop?

Daria Kaleniuk: I can name the person who is behind that. It’s Oleh Tatarov, deputy chief of staff of President Zelensky. He is officially coordinating the reform of all law enforcement agencies in Ukraine. And unofficially he is coordinating the work of most of the law enforcement agencies in Ukraine. Without his blessing, the attacks on civil society organizations, activists, and investigative journalists by law enforcement agencies are impossible.

It’s a very dangerous tendency which started at the end of last year. Because in 2022, and early 2023, everybody was united. Investigative journalists and civil society activists were doing their job. But the more we have started to expose problems of some of the agencies, and some of the institutions, including the procurement in the defense sector, the more some bad people decided to use a very convenient tool, mobilization, which is a sensitive topic in Ukraine, in order to discredit civil society activists, watchdog activists and investigative journalists.

Drop them to the army and send them to some places to make sure that they are not able to speak freely about the issues they are speaking about. And then use this to discredit civil society activists and investigative journalists in society, saying that, you see, they don’t have to talk about corruption or some notorious public officials. They don’t have the right to do so, because there are so many Ukrainians who are in the trenches protecting Ukraine from Russians, but not these guys.

Brian Bonner: I’ve read a lot about Oleh Tatarov, but I think many of our readers need to be reminded why he’s so dangerous in his current position. I believe your position, and civil society’s position, is that he has to go.

Daria Kaleniuk: First thing, Oleh Tatarov was charged with corruption by newly established anti-corruption agencies which Ukraine built after the Revolution of Dignity. He was charged by NABU, National Anti-Corruption Bureau, for giving bribes involving the construction of apartments for the military. It was back in 2018, 2019, so many years ago. But the charges came when he was already appointed as deputy chief of staff of President Zelensky. Andriy Yermak, the chief of staff for President Zelensky, invited Tatarov to this position. A brilliant leader of the globe who was named by Time as one of the top 100 leaders in the world.

So, one of the top hundred leaders of the world put Oleh Tatarov in this position. Zelensky approved that. After the charges were brought, the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, Iryna Venediktova, dropped those charges. So she took the case from NABU (the National Anticorruption Bureau of Ukraine), sent it to old non-reformed agencies, changed the prosecutor, and closed the case. And Oleh Tatarov kept working as if nothing had happened. He’s still in charge of law enforcement agencies in Ukraine.

So, there was a clear conflict of interest. It’s the first thing. The second thing is that during the Revolution of Dignity, Oleh Tatarov was serving in the special police units. And I want to remind you that in November 2013 and December 2013, special police units physically attacked protesters who went peacefully to the rally against President (Victor) Yanukovych’s decision to walk away from the EU.

Oleh Tatarov went public, saying that these are not the special police units attacking protesters. These are protesters attacking special police units. And this person is in charge of our justice in the office of President Zelensky.

Brian Bonner: Do you think he instigated the Yanukovych violence or just recommended it against protesters?

Daria Kaleniuk: I think he was part of the Yanukovych system, a pro-Russian Yanukovych system that attacked civil society. He’s part of the problem; he’s not a solution. I don’t see any reason why Zelensky would want to keep him in this position. I see only reason for Yermak to keep him is to control law enforcement agencies.

Brian Bonner: So the answer is, with him in a position of power, great power, do we have any hope to get rule of law and transparency?

Daria Kaleniuk: No. While Tatarov is in charge of justice in the Zelenskyy office, we don’t have any chance of reforming law enforcement agencies, the prosecutor’s office, the police, or the security service of Ukraine. And I’m saying this literally every day in Ukrainian and foreign media.

I think Zelensky receives a lot of criticism because of that. Ukrainian society demands change, but for some reason, Zelensky and Yermak decide to keep this very effective manager in his position. So let’s just guess why he’s such an important professional and what he’s doing for Yermak and Zelensky.

Does Zelensky have too much power in his hands?

Brian Bonner: I hope they’re listening and I hope they will act because it’s not going to help the country. And I think we can do more than guess. But this is all under the heading of big power bestowed on a president during wartime and martial law. He has more power than in non-war times. Is he the biggest abuse or are there other abuses?

I believe civil society is not happy, I’ve talked to many people. Civil society is not happy with the powers that Yermak has and the apparatus that he’s built around him. What’s the problem there? And what other abuses are you seeing during martial law?

Daria Kaleniuk: Even before martial law, Zelensky had a lot of power because of his popularity. He got 74% of the votes during the presidential elections. His party, The Servant of the People, received a majority in the parliament. So he didn’t even have to negotiate about the coalition. And he didn’t have to negotiate with the opposition about how to compose the government.

He appointed the prime minister and the government of Ukraine and controlled the parliament because of the Servant of the People. So, he controlled two out of three branches of power. However, after the large-scale invasion, the president’s role increased even more for obvious reasons. According to the Constitution, the president is the top commander in chief of Ukraine. Under martial law, he has increased powers.

He’s influenced foreign policy, he’s influenced defense. Zelensky was extremely busy with all these media appearances, negotiations, and working on mobilizing the world to help Ukraine. Yermak, he’s the chief of staff who is with Zelenskyy 24/7. Whenever you see a photo of Zelensky, show me those photos where you haven’t also seen Yermak for the last two years.

Brian Bonner: This is one reason why it’s hard to believe Zelensky doesn’t know what’s going on.

Daria Kaleniuk: Clearly Zelensky knows. But for some reason he trusts Yermak.

Brian Bonner: Do we have to guess at that too? Answer the question for all of us who are still guessing, why are Tatarov and Yermak in their positions?

Daria Kaleniuk: Tatarov is in his position because he is useful to Yermak. Why Yermak is in his position is a big question to Volodymyr Zelensky. Because Yermak rose to the level of being really the vice president of Ukraine. He has more powers than the prime minister of Ukraine. He replaced the minister of foreign affairs. He, I think, feels empowered when he has direct contact with all national security advisers in the world. While his position is not the national security adviser. We have a separate position of national security adviser.

So, he’s just the chief of staff. Yermak has interesting advisors, many of whom are non-paid. They didn’t declare their assets, and they didn’t go through any special checks. But they travel with Yermak to very important negotiations. Darya Zarivna and a few other external advisors. These external non-paid advisors with no clearances sometimes have more power than the ministers. This is not the way of governing the country during a large-scale invasion. And this is not building trust, unfortunately.

Brian Bonner: You know, I was at Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s (former prime minister of Ukraine – ed.) security forum recently. And there’s discontent bubbling up, you would know the extent better than I do. Other political factions, let’s put it that way, they feel highly marginalized and highly defeated. Like they have zero voice in running the affairs.

As you know, we didn’t have elections during the war. I agree with that; I think it’s foolish for a democracy to have an election during the war. But other people say, well, if we’re not going to have that, why don’t we have a unity government that brings in (ex-President Petro) Poroshenko, Yatsenyuk, (Kyiv Mayor Vitali) Klitschko, or whatever? Everybody, like a war cabinet. Do you agree with that?

Daria Kaleniuk: I think it’s a very naive idea. I think we need to have a government of professionals who are not restricted to being loyal to Zelensky and Yermak. Because those who have independent thinking and who can challenge the opinions of Zelensky and Yermak are not staying in government for a long time. Even The Servant of the People faction and the politicians don’t have that level of access to Zelensky, which they should have.

Brian Bonner: I even heard some MPs haven’t met him yet. Or he hasn’t met them, I don’t know.

Daria Kaleniuk: Well, Zelensky doesn’t bother about the parliament. He doesn’t treat them as something important.

Brian Bonner: So what is the solution then? Probably it’s not a simple solution.

Daria Kaleniuk: This is not a simple solution. I think Zelensky needs to understand the threat coming from Yermak. And Yermak clearly has more ambitions than just being Zelenskyy’s shadow. You know, there is a joke: every vice president wants to be the president. I think Yermak has this ambition. I think he thinks he’s more influential, smart, and important than Zelensky.

And even the international media started to notice this. You know, in Politico, I was in their office in Brussels in February this year. There’s a big wall with portraits of the leaders of 2024. And on top of that wall were (European Commission President) Ursula von der Leyen, (French President) Emmanuel Macron, the president of Turkey (Recep Tayyip) Erdogan, and Andriy Yermak.

Brian Bonner: Which picture does not belong here?

Daria Kaleniuk: Green cardinal of Kyiv. What the hell is that? And there was Zelensky too, but a few levels down, jointly with (Alexei) Navalny as a dreamer.

Brian Bonner: Well, let’s put it this way, my money is on the Ukrainian people who know what to do with politicians who they stop supporting. They vote them out of office quite regularly.

Daria Kaleniuk: They would have voted many inefficient people from the Ukrainian government and parliament and presidential office if you had had elections. But I fully agree we can’t have elections now because Russia will use these to kill Ukrainian democracy. Literally, they will just fire hundreds of missiles on the day of the elections and we are done.

The corruption we don’t know about

Brian Bonner: It goes back to the original question, the intent. Do you want to govern well and for the people or you don’t? And the issues you’ve raised are disturbing. The other thing that comes up from journalists is you know how hard it is to dig up corruption when people are against you all the time and not giving you information.

But Sevgil Musayeva, chief editor of Ukrainska Pravda, said, and I’m paraphrasing, I was there for it. She said, I really hope that we don’t find out at the end of this war that there was a lot of corruption that we were ripped off, that we were stolen from during the war. How worried are you about that? That we don’t know the full extent of what’s going on?

Daria Kaleniuk: We do know what is happening. During the large-scale invasion, we tried to fix the issues non-publicly. But if we’re not able to do that, we went public. The self-censorship of Ukrainian investigative journalists and civil society began over a year ago. When we expose problems and talk about them publicly, officials must react. Zelensky, as a mirror of the country, must react; he can’t just ignore that.

Brian Bonner: Do you believe that even if we don’t get justice in a court of law, just exposing them has a deterrent effect?

Daria Kaleniuk: Exposing corruption during the war is causing resignations and important investigations. It is causing policy changes, like with defense procurements. So this is the only way to go. And yes, we can’t have elections. However, if you look at the social polling, Ukrainians as a society think that corruption is the number two threat to national security after the war.

It reflects the maturity of Ukrainian society and the demand of Ukrainian society to the president to deliver justice. And that’s what makes us different from Belarus, Russia or other countries like that. It is impossible to have autocracy in Ukraine. In Ukraine, democracy is in the blood. We are very decentralized, there are a lot of initiatives.

We actually survived in the first days after the large-scale invasion because so many grassroots initiatives stood up the army. People started to self-organize, disregarding whatever the state was doing.

Brian Bonner: I suppose our viewers and listeners know I could talk to Daria for hours because she is so knowledgeable. My money is on civil society and the Ukrainian people in this struggle. There are a lot of things I wanted to talk about during the war, but we’ll have to save them for another time.

I mean, during the war, we fired a lot of people: the prosecutor general (Venedyktova), the SBU chief (Ivan Bakanov), and the National Bank of Ukraine governor (Kyrylo Shevchenko). And a key deputy head, Kyrylo Tymoshenko, who’s back in the Defense Ministry, I hope he’s not anywhere near procurement, Reznikov, and so on. The list goes on.

And then we still have a way to go before we have swift and sure justice. As far as I know, the (Ihor) Kolomoisky case and Rotterdam+ to (ex-member of parliament Mykola) Martynenko and many other cases are still winding their way through courts.

Daria Kaleniuk: It’s in progress in the High Anti-Corruption Court. But the good thing about judicial reform is that during the large-scale invasion, we fully rebooted the High Qualification Commission of Judges and the High Council of Judges.

These are judicial self-governance bodies, the firing and hiring bodies for judges. We’ve got the law passed in the summer of 2021. In the summer of 2022, during the large-scale invasion, we were in the full implementation phase. So now these judicial self-governance bodies are firing very notorious judges. This is a good thing; we have to give credit to Zelensky for that.

How to release journalists-hostages of the Putin regime?

«By drawing attention to the category of journalists, we highlight the plight of all civilian hostages»

Yaroslav Yurchyshyn: Our shared objective is the liberation of all civilians. Russia fabricates numerous cases. On one hand, it falsifies claims that individuals like Vlad Yesypenko, Iryna Danilovych, Nariman Dzhelal, and others arrested in the occupied territories are Russian citizens, despite the majority not having received Russian passports. However, Russia issues passports to all residents of the occupied territories and often presents them during trials as alleged proof of citizenship, thereby subjecting them to its criminal law, which it lacks jurisdiction to do.

Accessing civilian hostages, including journalists, is challenging. All information is consolidated by the Coordination Headquarters for Prisoners of War. Through it, we verify data received by human rights activists, primarily through lawyers handling cases involving Russian hostages. This poses a double risk for lawyers, as obtaining the status of a foreign agent in Russia is easy and leads to numerous problems.

The situation is highly complex. Therefore, as a Committee and as the Verkhovna Rada, we opted to categorize journalists separately. Firstly, international law safeguards the work of journalists during conflicts and wars, with both conflicting parties obligated to uphold these rights, which Russia violates.

Secondly, during my recent visit to Germany, I discussed our captive journalists with the deputy chairman of the Committee on Culture and Information.

How does this mechanism function? We’re addressing at least 26 captive journalists, while the global community discusses thousands of civilians in captivity. By spotlighting one category, we effectively bring attention to all.

We’ve reached out to all international organizations with mechanisms to influence global human rights situations, including the European Parliament, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe. Additionally, we’ve engaged specialized NGOs like Reporters Without Borders and the International Federation of Journalists. Already, the International Press Institute and numerous other organizations with various leverage mechanisms have approached us during the process.

For instance, Reporters Without Borders appealed to the OSCE under the Moscow Mechanism, a special framework established by the OSCE to document violations by Russia and Ukraine. They primarily focus on Russia, which aligns with our commitment to adhering to international standards, unlike Russia, which consistently disregards them.

The OSCE has furnished a comprehensive report containing a wealth of information. We can leverage it in two ways: first, as evidence in our legal proceedings, including the impending tribunal against Russia, and second, to highlight pressing issues, such as the case of Victoria Roshchina, a journalist who contributed to various Ukrainian publications, with her latest work being for Ukrainska Pravda.

The situation remains highly challenging. For over a quarter, we have had no reliable information about Victoria’s whereabouts. Both Europe and the Western world are actively utilizing all available channels, including liaising with the Ombudsman, utilizing business networks, and employing informal procedures, to at least provide Victoria’s relatives with information regarding her well-being and whereabouts.

The Russian authorities attempt to portray Crimean Tatar and Melitopol journalists as part of an underground organization with the aim of destabilizing governments. Concerning Vlad Yesypenko, the situation is dire. He has served most of his term, which was imposed entirely unlawfully. However, several elements of his case were omitted from the initial verdict, leaving room for manipulations that could result in an extension of his sentence. Such tactics have been recurrent in cases involving Crimean political prisoners under the Putin regime.

That’s why garnering widespread, global attention is crucial. The Western world possesses numerous mechanisms, many of which remain untapped. These include imposing stricter sanctions, implementing personal sanctions against individuals responsible for issuing verdicts, broadening the Magnitsky list, or establishing another list targeting those involved in cases against Ukrainian civilians.

To many, these individuals are merely statistics. Proportionally, they represent a small fraction of all civilian hostages. However, for each family affected, these individuals are unique and irreplaceable. Moreover, for us as a nation, every individual we manage to secure the release of holds immense importance.


Read also: How the Moscow Mechanism will help release illegally detained civilians


«Russia as a terrorist country will raise the price»

Yaroslav Yurchyshyn: Pressuring Russia through additional sanctions targeting Russian banks would prove far more effective than relying on statements like Joe Biden’s 3-5-7 plan. However, it’s evident that such actions would impact the entire US economy. Therefore, sanctions should be tailored specifically to address particular offenses rather than being generalized.

Numerous resources tied to the Russian government exist in many countries. Confiscating a single luxury yacht could easily lead to the release of several of our citizens, as cynical as it may sound.

On the Ukrainian side, discussions about potential exchanges are ongoing. There was a proposal to exchange Nestor Shufrych for Ukrainian journalists, which, in terms of value, might be the most beneficial solution. However, the willingness of Russia to engage in such swaps remains uncertain, given the significance of the figures involved.

Our primary objective is the safe return of every Ukrainian citizen. While we have established international mechanisms for prisoners of war, the situation regarding civilians is considerably more complex. We must exhaust all available options. We acknowledge that Russia, being labeled a terrorist state, will likely demand higher prices. However, no price is too high when it comes to human life and well-being. For instance, individuals like Irina Danilovich face health issues and lack proper medical care, constituting torture—a fact that will be highlighted in international courts. Our mission is to ensure she survives until the moment of her release.


Read also: Political sponsor for those illegally imprisoned by the Russians — explains the wife of the civilian hostage


«The release of 26 journalists is not a competition against the release of other civilians»

Yaroslav Yurchyshyn: The appeal from the Verkhovna Rada to release all civilian hostages was adopted back in 2022, and efforts in this regard are ongoing. It is in everyone’s interest to draw attention to the plight of civilian hostages through various means.

When we raised the issue of Ukrainian journalists in the Bundestag, our colleagues immediately proposed two resolutions. The first addressed Ukrainian journalists’ protection and Russia’s obligations regarding freedom of speech. The second focused on the release of all Ukrainian hostages, encompassing civilians and military personnel in Russian-controlled territories. By highlighting one category, we effectively broaden the scope for addressing other categories.

The Ukrainian state’s objective is to secure the release of all individuals. We will utilize every available mechanism to achieve this goal, emphasizing, uniting, and reinforcing our efforts. The release of 26 journalists does not overshadow the release of other civilians. Approaching the issue through specific categories increases our chances of gaining attention on the international stage, especially considering the existence of organizations dedicated specifically to journalists.

When relatives advocate for their loved ones, they not only speak about their own family members but also shed light on the hundreds and thousands of individuals facing similar circumstances. It’s crucial to recognize that we are all united in our desire to secure the release of civilian hostages.

Effective measures are those that directly impact those accountable for this crisis—the Russians. Actions taken near Russian embassies in Europe not only draw attention to the plight of Ukrainian civilian hostages among Russians, prompting reactions, but also among citizens of the host countries witnessing these events.


Read also: Why illegally detained civilians are left without social protection from the state


On the availability of information regarding civilians in detention

Yaroslav Yurchyshyn: The situation varies significantly. In the majority of cases, there was little to no information available about individuals detained following the onset of full-scale aggression, such as Dmytro Khilyuk. We recognize that the Russians aim to demoralize us and coerce cooperation. We have documented instances of torture and other forms of psychological and physical coercion being used. When coercion fails, they attempt to portray our hostages as combatants—individuals who resisted Russian aggression. For instance, they endeavor to depict a sizable group of journalists affiliated with online publications in Melitopol as collaborators who, purportedly holding Russian citizenship, opposed the occupying authorities.

Each case presents its own unique circumstances. Take, for instance, the case of Dmytro Khilyuk. Until recently, we had little information about his situation. It wasn’t until the Red Cross received details regarding the fabrication of a case against him that we gained insight. Dmytro was taken hostage during the occupation of the Kyiv region. Subsequently, we discovered attempts to portray him almost as a combatant.

For individuals facing fabricated charges, we collaborate with international organizations to identify lawyers who can dismantle the false accusations. This endeavor holds significant importance for us, as each case will undergo appeals in international courts. The most challenging scenarios arise when we lack information and are unsure of how to proceed. Therefore, our primary objective is to obtain information about the individual’s whereabouts and situation, even if it means relying on international partners, organizations, human rights groups, and journalists.


Read also: 108 days in Olenivka and no compensation for captivity from the state


Regarding the expansion of the Magnitsky List

Yaroslav Yurchyshyn: We are collaborating with the Helsinki Commission of the US Congress, which champions the Magnitsky List and its enlargement. There’s a significant challenge here, given the upcoming major elections in the US. Consequently, there are numerous matters that should already be in progress. However, this doesn’t negate the importance of undertaking preparatory actions with institutions that remain operational.

In conjunction with Reporters Without Borders, the International Federation, and the European Federation of Journalists, we are exploring various avenues to determine where we can contribute. Securing a resolution from Ukrainian authorities was crucial for us, as it provides the platform from which we can advocate. Whenever we engage with international partners, they often inquire: «What steps have you taken in this regard?» Thus, having this resolution grants us more leverage. Therefore, I anticipate that we, along with the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the Red Cross, and specialized organizations, will intensify efforts in this direction.


Read also: Helping civilians in illegal detention and their families — NGO «Egida-Zaporizhzhia»


In times of war, the program «Free our relatives» tells the stories of people, cities, villages, and entire regions that have been captured by Russian invaders. We discuss the war crimes committed by the Kremlin and its troops against the Ukrainian people.

The program is hosted by Ihor Kotelyanets and Anastasia Bagalika.


This publication is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the framework of the Human Rights in Action Program implemented by Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union. Opinions, conclusions and recommendations presented in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID, the United States Government. The contents are the responsibility of the authors.

USAID is the world’s premier international development agency and a catalytic actor driving development results. USAID’s work demonstrates American generosity, and promotes a path to recipient self-reliance and resilience, and advances U.S. national security and economic prosperity. USAID has partnered with Ukraine since 1992, providing more than $9 billion in assistance. USAID’s current strategic priorities include strengthening democracy and good governance, promoting economic development and energy security, improving health care systems, and mitigating the effects of the conflict in the east.

For additional information about USAID in Ukraine, please call USAID’s Development Outreach and Communications Office at: +38 (044) 521-5753. You may also visit our website: http://www.usaid.gov/ukraine or our Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/USAIDUkraine.