Brian Bonner: Good day, everybody. This is Brian Bonner, host of Hromadske Radio’s Ukraine Calling Program. We are in August, and big things tend to happen in August, especially in Russia and Ukraine.
So with me today, I couldn’t think of a finer person to talk about what is happening in Russia’s war on Ukraine, especially with the Ukrainian incursion into Russian territory that is now a week old. Alex Motyl, welcome to the program.
Alexander Motyl: Thank you for having me, Brian. It’s a pleasure.
Brian Bonner: Alex is a Ph.D., so he’s Dr. Motyl. He’s a professor of political science at Rutgers University in Newark. I have to take one of your classes sometime; they must be fascinating. You’re the author of at least 10 books, all on my reading list, along with many others I hope to get to. At least four of them are fiction. But Alex has really distinguished himself.
He was always prolific, but he seems to have really hit his stride as a writer during the full-scale invasion. His work is published almost daily, almost everywhere, in The Hill and other places. Before we jump into everything, Alex, you seem really motivated to cover and comment on this war. Is it personal reasons, or do you just have so much more material to work with as a writer?
Alexander Motyl: Well, the latter is true to some degree, of course, but it’s frankly a personal issue. I take the war very personally. I’ve devoted something like 50, 55 years of my life in various forms to the Ukrainian cause, however defined.
When Ukraine finally became independent and seemed to be on the way to becoming more or less democratic, more or less prosperous—at least evolving in the right way—that felt like the culmination of my mission in life, my political mission in life, as it did for many others as well. So the war, to me, is an outrage. It’s stupid, unnecessary, criminal—all those things apply. But it’s also an outrage to me personally. I can’t forgive (Russian President Vladimir) Putin. I don’t think Ukrainians can forgive Putin, rightly so.
Even in my New York apartment I can’t forgive Putin for what he did to Ukraine and for what he did to me. So I’ve taken this very personally. I’m on a warpath. Part of my mission over the last two years is to persuade the world that Putin is a criminal, a fascist, an imperialist, an embodiment of evil, quite frankly.
Brian Bonner: I agree. I find your commentaries motivating. I think a lot of people do, because we’re still not quite there yet in terms of universal acceptance of the view of Putin, which I agree with, as an American living in Ukraine as a permanent resident. He has damaged the nation in ways that will take a long time to recover from, assuming we get out of this war in good shape.
For those who haven’t read Alex’s work, I’ve read dozens, maybe hundreds of his columns. Before we talked, I went back to the Kyiv Post, which I led for 14 years from 2008 to 2021, and we started publishing and republishing Alex’s columns in 2010. They were very prescient. I came across one today from when Viktor Yanukovych had just taken power in 2010, and sure enough, there’s Alex’s column: “If Yanukovych doesn’t change course he will inspire a revolution.” Well worth watching and books well worth reading.
Brian Bonner: Alex, jumping into the news, it’s now a week since this surprise incursion. Do we know yet whether it’s going to change the course of the war, or if it’s just going to be a short-lived morale boost? Or is it too soon to tell?
Alexander Motyl: Well, it’s obviously too soon to tell. On the other hand, I disagree with those who say it’s just a small incursion and that Ukraine will have to withdraw eventually because they won’t be able to sustain the losses in holding these territories, making it no more than a blip. I disagree. Even if Ukraine only holds a few more hundred square kilometers and eventually starts withdrawing—whether in a few weeks or months—the mere fact of this operation is of enormous importance. I call it a special military operation, not just an incursion. It shows, among other things, that Ukraine remains in the game.
The prevalent view over the last few months, especially in the West, and to some degree in Ukraine and certainly in Russia, has been that Ukraine won’t be able to win back the territories it’s lost, that the situation on the battleground is a stalemate, and that the war is never-ending—a permanent stalemate. You’ve heard all this: the only thing left to do is declare a ceasefire, go to the negotiating table, give Putin what he wants or some of what he wants.
But this shows that the Ukrainians are far from defeated. As the national anthem says, «Ukraine is not yet dead.» It’s anything but that. This operation clearly demonstrates Ukraine’s capacity to drive forward and seize territory, and even if they eventually withdraw, they will have made that point.
This incursion is also important because it has radically changed the discourse in the United States and Europe, though I’m less familiar with the European perspective. The prevalent view until last week was that this was a dead end, and that was pretty much it. Now, suddenly, all the commentators, including military ones who never foresaw this or predicted it would be over within a day or two, are now talking about the possibility of this being a game-changer with significant impact on the war. That may or may not happen—I hope it does—but it doesn’t matter. The fact is that the discourse has changed, and in the United States, this change couldn’t have come at a more appropriate time as we are in the throes of an electoral campaign.
Both sides are making references to the war in Ukraine, and the fact that Ukraine has shown what it can do obviously bolsters the view of people like (Kamala) Harris and (Tim) Walz that supporting Ukraine isn’t just a waste of American resources. It forces people like (Donald) Trump and (JD) Vance to be perhaps a little more proactive in their attitude towards Ukraine; they can’t just assume this is going to be a never-ending war. So, Ukraine has achieved an enormous amount, regardless of what the ultimate conclusion of this incursion will be.
Brian Bonner: There are limits, though, and even soldiers have been quoted as saying they don’t have the logistics to go deeper into Russia. Maybe that’s not the aim, but one thing seems clear: this did show what Ukraine is capable of doing if it got the weapons it needed instead of halting Western support that it had.
Alexander Motyl: It also showed the depths of Russian incompetence. That was the prevailing view of the Russian army for about a year after the invasion—how could they possibly have gotten so much wrong so quickly, so extensively? Then the Russians seemed to bounce back; they were counter-attacking, resisting, and started this incremental movement in the area. The view was that the Russians, both within Russia and outside, had gotten their act together, and who knows what this would mean for the Ukrainians and the war.
Well, this particular incursion, the rapidity with which the Ukrainians have been able to capture these territories, the fact that thousands of Russians fled—just threw their stuff on the ground and ran, similar to what happened in Kharkiv a couple of years ago—and it seems at least several hundred, possibly close to a thousand or two, have surrendered. These guys, some of whom haven’t even had a shower in weeks, are unfed. All of this is testimony to the fact that the Russian army is in very bad shape.
It’s also testimony to the fact that the FSB (Russian Federal Security Service), the military intelligence and all those people who are getting paid big bucks to foresee what Ukrainian plans are, are incapable of doing so. This is wonderful news for Ukraine because it really shows that we’re talking about a colossus with clay feet.
Brian Bonner: Indeed. In retrospect, it looks like the Ukrainian military leadership paid very close attention to (Yevheniy) Prigozhin’s aborted march on Moscow. I’m also wondering if the Free Russia insurgents helped with intelligence or if Ukraine had good intelligence on the ground. All that is very encouraging.
I know you’re optimistic, and some people call me pessimistic—I would say realistic—but we’ve been there before. I was encouraged when Ukraine took back Kyiv and Kharkiv, and we hoped that Russia would collapse, and Putin would die. But that just seems like a hope because they do seem to be a lumbering giant that slowly comes back.
And today, just before our conversation, Anastasia Edel published an op-ed in The New York Times saying that Putin is on the cusp of victory and that the West is not going to stay with Ukraine, et etera. You believe that this could change the narrative, but do you think it’s enough to change it?
Alexander Motyl: Well, it obviously depends on what happens in the next few weeks. If Russia rallies its forces and throws out the Ukrainians in a humiliating fashion, then people will argue, “Aha, we told you so—Ukrainians may be capable of a brief incursion, but they can’t compete with Russian forces.”
If, alternatively, the Ukrainians manage to hold on to a good portion of this territory for a significant period of time—at least until the U.S. elections—then the argument that Ukraine is a pygmy with clay feet will be difficult to make. Even if the Ukrainians withdraw a bit but remain in control of even a sliver of Russian territory, that will still be significant.
It will be significant because everyone, especially Putin, has been saying, “Why don’t we just freeze things as they are and proceed on that basis?” If the Ukrainians control even a sliver of Russian territory, they can say, “Sure, let’s do it.” But Putin is in no position to surrender Russian territory, even if it’s just one square kilometer. That would be impossible for him and his legitimacy. So, as long as Ukraine controls some Russian territory, that argument cannot be made by the Russians or anyone else because they will never agree to giving up sacred Russian territory.
Brian Bonner: Especially when they consider Ukraine part of their territory. You’ve talked about there being no point in any negotiation with Putin. This has to be a clear Ukrainian victory. Do you still believe there’s no hope for any kind of negotiation that would be acceptable to Ukraine?
Alexander Motyl: Well, yes. But that doesn’t mean Ukraine shouldn’t constantly be calling for negotiations. And, of course, they’re doing that by organizing peace summits. (President Volodymyr) Zelensky and others have been saying—and should continue to say—that they’re always ready to sit down at the table and negotiate everything, on the condition that all the territories, or at least some, be returned to Ukraine.
Ukraine should certainly continue making that point. I don’t see how Putin can agree to anything short of what he wants, which is, at the very most he wants the complete destruction of the Ukrainian state and nation. Minimally he wants to retain Crimea and the entirety of four oblasts—Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Kherson. And, as you know, he doesn’t even control all four of them. Technically, by virtue of Russia’s annexing these territories and making them part of the Russian Federation, according to Putin, it’s Ukraine that is occupying Russia, not the other way around. He can’t give up those territories. He would have to change the Constitution to enable Russia to de-annex territories.
Even though that sounds like a formality, Putin has to concern himself with legitimacy. I just don’t see him making that move. Last but not least, keep in mind that Putin has identified himself 100% with the outcome of the war. He’s done that; the Russians have done that. Remember when (Vladislav) Surkov declared about 10 years ago that there is no Russia without Putin?
By extension, Putin is identical to the war, and his survival now depends on the outcome. For him to agree to losing parts of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, and Donetsk, he would have to say, “Even though these territories are annexed, I’m giving them back to Ukraine.” He can’t say that. Someone else could if he’s overthrown. Another Russian could come in and say, “Look, this is Putin’s mistake; we’re going to change the Constitution,” but Putin can’t say that.
Brian Bonner: That argues for an endless war. And the other thing is, as you pointed out, who would enforce a peace agreement with Vladimir Putin, who hasn’t lived up to any of them? I don’t see a force in the world that can do that. Do you?
Alexander Motyl: Well, that’s the other point. Even assuming he were to sit down and agree to all sorts of wonderful things—he could agree to Ukraine’s permanent security, and he could even claim that Russia will never attack. No one would believe that, and no one should. And if and when he breaks that particular promise, what then?
That’s why all these discussions about Putin going to the negotiating table are pie in the sky. The people who promote these views, at least in the West, are generally international relations experts who have no knowledge of Russia or Ukraine. They’re simply projecting their image of some sort of rational leader. If there’s anything we can say about Putin, it’s that his rationality is very foreign to the way most Americans and Europeans think. Now, whether that’s rational in his peculiar sense or irrational, it doesn’t really matter. It’s the rationality of a person living on a different planet.
Brian Bonner: You wrote for many years that Ukraine should just give up the Donbas. Do you still feel that way?
Alexander Motyl: Well, the argument was a little more nuanced. I argued that Ukraine is better off without that particular territory. This is an argument I started making in 2014, namely: it’s occupied. That means you don’t have to provide it with economic subsidies, which are enormous. You don’t have to worry about a resurgence of the Communist Party or the Party of Regions. This particular electorate will not be taking part in general elections. In other words, one of the main obstacles—arguably the main obstacle—to Ukraine’s reform efforts and its move westwards is no longer an issue. It’s out there, so accept it for what it is. Whether it’s occupied temporarily or not, who cares? The point is, it’s occupied.
In the meantime, that gives you the opportunity—namely, you Ukrainians in pro-Western, pro-reform Ukraine—to roll up your sleeves and introduce a variety of reforms. Make Ukraine more democratic, more prosperous, more Ukrainian, more Western, and so on. Which, by the way, is essentially what happened under (President Petro) Poroshenko. I don’t want to idealize him, but that’s basically what Ukraine was doing. None of that would have happened had it not been for the fact that this particular territory, including Crimea, had been occupied by the Russians.
These were always the populations that were most retrograde, most anti-Western, most anti-Ukrainian, most pro-Soviet, most pro-Russian. Suddenly they’re gone. Now, whether they’re gone permanently or not, who knows? But take advantage of the situation. Rather than bemoaning the fact that they are now on the other side of the battlefront, take advantage of this and start reforming your country in the appropriate way.
So, would I make the same argument today? Well, to some degree, you don’t have to worry about those populations anymore. Of course, we don’t really know who’s left in the Donbas, and we don’t know what their political views are. For all we know, they may now be (Stepan) Bandera supporters as opposed to (Vladimir) Lenin supporters. But that said, don’t hurry with re-annexation. Take advantage of this lull and introduce the appropriate changes. Get Ukraine as close as possible to the EU and NATO in the time that you have, and then be in a position, if and when these territories are fully or partially re-incorporated, to move westwards—in a reformed direction anyway, regardless of whether or not these territories or populations represent a ballast or hindrance.
Brian Bonner: Given what you’ve said and Putin’s imperial ideology, which you’ve written books about, and considering that NATO membership seems to be the only guarantee, we’re looking at a war that won’t end soon. As Zelensky mentioned at the beginning of the war, Ukraine has to become a big Israel.
Is Ukraine capable of that? You’ve likely noticed the problems they’ve been having with mobilizing enough troops and supplying sufficient resources to reduce their dependence on the West. Can Ukrainian society, as you understand it, handle the task of a prolonged war?
Alexander Motyl: Before I address that, let me first discuss the idea that this will be an endless war. This view assumes Russia’s ability to sustain such a war, and I am not certain that Russia can conduct an endless war.
Personally, I believe that time is on Ukraine’s side, not just because I’m an optimist, but because time is definitely not on Putin’s side. For starters, we cannot assume that Putin will remain in power indefinitely. He’s been in power for 25 years and is currently around 72 years old. For a Russian male, this is an astounding longevity.
So if Mother Nature doesn’t take care of him, it’s not inconceivable or rather, let me put it this way, it is extremely likely that sooner or later, there will be something resembling a putsch, a coup, an effort to push him to the side. Again, I firmly believe that. I’m not the only one. As you know, I mean, there are lots of Russians and Ukrainians who are of this view as well.
But I do think that’s very, very likely, if only because whatever one can say about the indifference to suffering or the indifference to democracy on the part of the Russian population. The fact is, neither most Russians nor most Russian elites are that stupid or so stupid as not to see that he’s driving the country into the ground. Now, does that mean that someone will therefore arise and challenge his power? Well, actually, yes. And that happened in mid-2023, with the Prigozhin coup attempt.
And more importantly than the Prigozhin attempt, or whatever it is, it’s often referred to as a mutiny. I think it was more than that. More important than the fact that he launched this mutiny is the fact that the FSB, the GRU (Russian military intelligence agency), and the military sat on the sidelines and simply watched.
Brian Bonner: I understand what that means. I’m really hoping and rooting that you are totally right again. Until that day, though, we see a Russian economy on a war footing. We see sanctions that are not particularly strong in cutting oil and gas or other revenue that Russia has.
And we see Ukraine under big stress in trying to manage that. This is aside from the political situation, which I hope we can address at the end of the conversation. Given the situation, it seems to me that this attitude is not just Putin’s; it appears to be deeply ingrained in Russian society, which views Ukraine as not a real country. Can Ukrainian society continue to fight this thing for many more years, if necessary?
Alexander Motyl: None of us knows the answer to that question, obviously. The best we can do is consider the reasons why one might assume the answer is yes. If the West continues to supply Ukraine with assistance, even at the current level, it will be beneficial. Yes, F-16s should have arrived a year ago, and they only arrived a few weeks ago. More HIMARS should have been provided a year ago as well. This piecemeal approach is definitely counterproductive. However, the alternative is not necessarily a sudden influx of ammunition and weapons. The alternative could be the viewpoint that Ukraine doesn’t matter, leading to a complete halt in assistance.
So, if the West continues to support Ukraine, and if Putin remains as he is—committed to a genocidal war with the ultimate goal of destroying the Ukrainian nation and state—then Ukrainians have no choice but to continue resisting.
Brian Bonner: Would you agree that this means throwing every able-bodied man aged 18 or 20 into the fight?
Alexander Motyl: Not necessarily. Looking at the battlefield over the last few months, the statistics are clear: the Russians are losing about 1,100 soldiers daily. The Ukrainian losses, whether one-third, one-fifth, or one-eighth of that number, are significantly lower.
Brian Bonner: But they have more to lose, and they don’t care about human life, as we’ve found out.
Alexander Motyl: That’s the point. How long will the Russians remain indifferent to the fact that 1,000 of their young men are being killed or wounded daily? It’s having some impact. Back in 2022, the Russians were offering 200,000 rubles to volunteers. Now, that amount has increased to about 2 million rubles, a significant rise over two years.
Brian Bonner: Translated to dollars, that’s about $60,000 a year if you’re from Moscow, which is quite a salary.
Alexander Motyl: It is impressive and indicative. Just using the supply and demand model: there are fewer people volunteering. Word has likely spread among Russians that being sent to the front in Donetsk means minimal chances of survival. Your chances of having a shower every four weeks is virtually non-existent. But your chances of survival are minimal as well. So, you know, as much as one needs to focus on the stresses to which the Ukrainian population is being subjected, one needs to keep in mind that the stresses to which the Russian population and the Russian elites are being subjected are as great, if not significantly greater.
Brian Bonner: They have more resources. I wanted to get your opinion, because this is a controversial issue. Would you support lowering the conscription age to 20 to have more people in the fight?
Alexander Motyl: Unfortunately, yes. I feel uncomfortable answering this because I am not of draft age and am sitting comfortably in New York, telling young Ukrainians to risk their lives. I don’t have a moral right to say that. But if I bracket the moral issue and just put on this kind of a cold-blooded realist hat then the answer to that question unfortunately is yes. That’s what all countries do in all wars. I understand the reason for not doing it but that said, it’s what all countries do in all wars and if you want to win then you need to do that for better or for worse.
Brian Bonner: It’s a tough one. Politics—maybe that’s a good way to close it out because you have a very unique perspective. You know a lot about Ukrainian history, but you’re also deeply up to speed with America. Most Ukrainians I know won’t say it out loud because they want to keep bipartisan support. But most Ukrainians are afraid of the prospect of Donald Trump. It didn’t go well in the first term, and they’re afraid that he may cut Ukraine loose.
I know others have suggested that Ukraine could actually benefit because Donald Trump will be a hawk. I believe you recently said that Donald Trump could take defeating Putin as an example of something he must do—not for any love of Ukraine, but just because of his ego. How likely is that, or should Ukraine have a clear favorite in this presidential race?
Alexander Motyl: Well, look, officially, Ukraine needs to adopt a position of neutrality. It doesn’t get involved in the internal affairs of other countries, especially its allies. This is a choice the American people must make. And, of course, that means having close relations with the current administration, with Kamala Harris, and maybe having some conversations with the other side as well. That’s perfectly legitimate. It doesn’t have to be the ambassador to the United States; it could be you, it could be anyone.
Now, having said all of that, what we can say with certainty about Harris and Walz, well with near certainty, is that they are likely at least to do what the Biden administration has done, possibly do more, but at least that. So these odds are very strong that at the very least this will continue. It may not be adequate, it may not be desirable, and it may fall short of hopes and expectations, but it’s at least a floor, a minimum, which is better than nothing.
The problem with the Trump and Vance position is that one can concoct any number of scenarios, but it’s not clear what the chances of their realization are. It’s possible that Trump, being Trump, will promote a very hard line against Putin.
It’s not inconceivable that he will decide to increase the amount of weapons and ammunition sent to Ukraine. Again, being unpredictable and occasionally contradicting himself, it’s perfectly possible that he’ll do that. As I suggested in one of my recent columns, and this is the argument you were referring to, we know one thing about Trump: he believes himself to be a God-given genius. There’s been no other genius like him in American history, arguably in world history.
On the other side of the ocean, there’s Vladimir Putin, who also thinks of himself as a God-given genius—or maybe a satanically-generated genius. But in any case, he sees himself as Russia’s salvation. The interesting thing is how this potential clash between two self-styled geniuses will play out. I don’t see how they can just sit back, have a beer, slap each other on the back, and resolve this in a way that benefits Russia. I don’t see how Trump could possibly agree to his counterpoint, his «counter-genius,» winning the day. That said, I don’t know—this is just pure speculation.
Brian Bonner: Well, you’re right. I call it three lanes: the isolationist «let’s drop Ukraine» lane, the Biden middle-of-the-road «not enough but adequate» lane, and then the hawkish lane. There are elements of the Republican Party there, but I don’t see any sign that Trump’s going to go there. But you’re right, it could happen. And as for Putin, remember when they surrendered Kyiv and ran out of Kharkiv, they described it as a «goodwill gesture.» So, I think he can repackage defeat as a victory because he controls public opinion.
Alexander Motyl: Well, he could do that. Putin can do that with the population. I agree with you there. Although remember, two years ago, it was easier to do so because everybody was still flush with enthusiasm. Now, after close to 600,000 dead and wounded, one has to assume that some Russians have seen the light and aren’t as willing to be bamboozled.
But the point for Putin, the problem for Putin, isn’t so much the population. I think we make a mistake in focusing on whether the population will rebel or not. Ultimately, they don’t really matter. In most revolutionary situations, the population doesn’t matter immediately. Again, I don’t want to dismiss that completely because we’ve witnessed Orange Revolutions, Maidans, and instances of people power.
But that said, it’s ultimately the elites. And if Putin wants to package a defeat or a seeming defeat as a victory, he might be able to convince Ivan Ivanovich in Irkutsk. I’m not sure he’ll be able to convince the people in the FSB, the army, the GRU, or the oligarchs who have been supporting him and who know very well what’s going on. They know that Putin has transformed the second most powerful army in the world into, as Ukrainians joke, the second most powerful army in Ukraine.
This is a scandal, and it’s obvious to anyone. You don’t have to be a Russia critic to understand that the loss of 600,000 men is a defeat. You don’t have to be an economist to understand that Russia’s economic relationship with China isn’t that of an equal partner. It’s that of a colony or, at best, a vassal. And Russians know this. So the question is, how long will these elites be persuaded that Putin can still save their country from defeat, possibly engineer some kind of victory? My guess, and again, this isn’t just mine—I’m repeating the views of many analysts in Russia and Ukraine—is that sooner rather than later, that proverbial cup will run over.
And again, this isn’t just theory. The Prigozhin affair, whatever that means, was obviously indicative of dissatisfaction on the part of one segment of the Russian elite—so much so that they were willing to march towards Moscow. That was impressive, albeit ultimately ineffective, but nevertheless impressive.
Brian Bonner: Well, let’s hope you will have an addendum to your work on how imperialistic societies end. Let me close by asking about your evolution of views on political leaders. Obviously, you were very right about Yanukovych. You had a more favorable view of Petro Poroshenko than I did and than the majority of Ukrainians did. You were very hard on Zelensky before the big war, justifiably so, as I learned.
And I wonder if that view has evolved. I preface that by saying that Ukrainians know victory is the only thing that really matters. They’re willing to put a lid on politics for now, but there’s a lot of pressure building up. I’ll go out on a limb and say that if the war ends on unfavorable terms for Ukraine, I think he’s finished because people are just tired of him. But they’re going to give him the chance to finish out the war. That’s my view. I wonder whether your views have evolved.
Alexander Motyl: I agree with you. I was extremely harsh on him during the campaign. I even wrote an op-ed—I forget where—where the headline was «Zelensky would be a catastrophe for Ukraine.» Maybe it was «disaster,» but it was one of those two words.
The argument was the standard one: how could you possibly want a comedian in charge of your country? And there was a lot to be said for that in the first two years. Yes, they hit the ground running and passed some reforms, which were not insignificant. But then they eventually got bogged down, which was probably foreseeable, given that the Friends of the People was this artificial conglomeration of random individuals. And Zelensky was, after all, a comedian who was suddenly placed in the position of president.
When the war broke out, and again, I agree with you completely, Ukrainian attitudes were changing toward him, as were mine. I was no longer as downbeat on him as I was during the electoral campaign because he did manage to hold the country together and pass a few reforms. But I was very sympathetic to the people who were criticizing him.
Then the war breaks out, and this individual turns into a leader. I think it was my very first op-ed that I wrote in the immediate aftermath of February 24th, when Zelensky stood his ground, refused to leave, and basically told the Russians, «Screw you.» I wrote an op-ed that appeared in the LA Times, suggesting that he’s the Ukrainian George Washington. From the «Woody Allen of Ukraine» to the «George Washington of Ukraine»—that’s quite an impressive change. And he’s fulfilled that role. He hasn’t been perfect, but in terms of rallying the troops, maintaining morale, representing the country abroad, twisting arms, and charming people, usually successfully, sometimes less so.
Brian Bonner: And learning English.
Alexander Motyl: And learning English, exactly, right. All of that is extremely impressive. At the same time, insufficient reforms and crony politics have obviously continued, and I agree with you completely that as soon as the war ends and the election is held, he’s very, very likely to lose. Of course, it will depend on who the alternative is.
But that said, he’s very likely to lose. That said, his place in Ukrainian history will be, I think, very positively remembered. People will forget whether he managed the economy and the polity as well as he should have or could have. But they will remember that this «Woody Allen» turned into a «George Washington» for a period of two, three, or four years and essentially was able to save the country.
Again, I wouldn’t suggest that he did this single-handedly—obviously not. But his role is not insignificant. And one can only imagine what would have happened to Ukraine if he had gotten on the first plane out of Kyiv. It’s not clear to me that Kyiv would have been defended. It’s not clear to me that the forces could have been rallied in the manner that they were. That would have been a clear signal to everyone that the ship had sunk.
Brian Bonner: Oh man, that would have been horrible. But I want to believe that Ukraine would defend itself and that it doesn’t depend on him. I don’t think it does anymore. Maybe it did. I wanted to ask you, and I’m skipping around a bit, but was there a time when Putin could have been stopped? Would it have been Chechnya, Georgia, Syria, Ukraine, or was it just the politics, the geopolitics?
Alexander Motyl: I mean, again, there are several answers to this question. One is that I think Putin could have been stopped if NATO had expanded in the early 2000s. A few years after he came to power, if NATO had expanded to include Ukraine and Belarus, that would have been perfect, as well as Moldova, of course. At that point, it was perfectly possible, despite the fact that most of the populations were not in support of that.
That said, leaders can still sign documents, so it didn’t matter. Had that happened, they would have been within NATO. Russia was far too weak to do anything about it. It would have squealed, it would have kicked and screamed, but they would have been within NATO. A clear statement would have been made by the West to Putin that we will take care of these countries.
Now, whether that would have held true 20 years later is another story. But that said, the chances of a massive war would have been reduced significantly. Instead, by expanding as far as it did but not including Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova, NATO cast them into an unsustainable no man’s land—a sort of security vacuum. On the one hand, you’ve got an indifferent Europe that says, «Yeah, we love you, but stay away.»
On the other hand, you’ve got a very interested Russia that says, «We love you, and yes, please come and join.» That’s just unsustainable. Hence, that multivector policy that Ukraine pursued was really the only rational response. If you’re stuck in the middle, you need to have good relations with both sides. Belarus tried to do the same thing over time, then basically sided with Russia, while Ukraine sided with the West.
But all of that could have been stopped if NATO had been expanded further. Alternatively, NATO could have not expanded at all, in which case the countries in the middle would have been forced to create some kind of mutual alliance. But NATO did the worst possible thing. That’s point one. I think at any step over the last 25 years, the problem with the West has been less about any particular policy at any particular point in time. It’s been about its overall attitudes toward Russia and Putin. The Germans typified this, but so did the Obama administration, Clinton, and many others as well. They were obsessed with the notion that they had won the Cold War, that history had ended, that liberalism would triumph, and that there was no alternative but to become liberal, democratic, and a good guy.
And yes, Russia wasn’t evolving quite the way we might have hoped it would, and yes, Putin was a pain in the neck. That said, ultimately, that didn’t matter because Mother Russia could be counted on to be reasonable and non-imperialistic and everything else. So the overall attitude on the part of world leaders, European and American leaders, business people in particular, was that there is no problem here at all. We can continue to build pipelines, we can continue to have close economic, political, and other relations, and everything will work itself out because it had to, because it was the end of history, because it was the end of the Cold War, and we had won.
I think it was that overall attitude, a kind of hegemonic worldview, that was the primary obstacle to seeing Russia for what it was—a very, very dangerous imperialist power headed by a man who was committed to a fascist vision of Russia. And to even suggest in public that this was a possibility to go against the rules of polite society. One couldn’t even suggest that, whereas, in fact, that was the case. So it took a war, even 2014 and the Maidan didn’t persuade too many people that Russia was a beast and that Putin was a monster.
You still had people thinking about the Minsk procedures, the Minsk Accords, and negotiations, believing that if we just give it a little bit of a college try, all will be well. It took a war, and it took a genocidal war and a full-scale invasion to wake people up to the fact that this country, Russia, and its leader, Putin, are monsters.
Brian Bonner: Are they fully awakened?
Alexander Motyl: And there again, the answer is no, they’re not. I’d say the majority are. That might be 51%, but even so, I do think the majority are. Compared to where we were three years ago, there’s been a sea change.
But that said, you look at some people in the so-called realist camp of international relations, like John Mearsheimer and others, who still believe, despite tons of evidence to the contrary, that the war is the result of NATO’s imminent desire and intent to incorporate Ukraine. Well, anyone who knows anything about NATO or Ukraine would have known that three years ago, Ukraine’s chances of becoming a member of NATO were exactly minus 100—not even zero.
Brian Bonner: Exactly. I mean, they wrote a 10-year strategy which said, you know, in the next 10 years, we will have closer relations. I agree, it was not on the table. So you’ve got some more writing to do because there’s a lot more people to convince.
Brian Bonner: I wanted to ask you about the damage. I mean, in my mind, Holodomor—I don’t know if there was a greater trauma for Ukrainians—4 million starved to death. It was a political starvation into submission by (Joseph) Stalin. Today, we have a lot of traumas, and we don’t know what the end is.
How much of a setback is this? And I’m talking about 6 million Ukrainians abroad. They’re alive, but many are not coming back until the end of the war. We’re talking about the lowest birth rate in decades. It could be a reduced territory. On the other side, they’ve come alive because it does seem that the will to have an independent Ukraine is not going to die.
Where do you see this in terms of setbacks?
Alexander Motyl: Well, the demography is obviously a clear-cut setback. I mean, I can’t imagine any positive spin for that as much as I would like to. But 6 million people have left, possibly more. As you suggested, some will return, some will not. We don’t know what the number is. It obviously depends on how long the war will take.
Where they happen to be living at the moment will also play a role. The fact that men have not been able to leave, while women and children have, might suggest that many of these women and children will ultimately return, assuming their menfolk, of course, are still alive. But that might be grasping at straws. We just don’t know.
It’s somewhat heartening to know that a couple of million are right next door in Poland, and probably a few hundred thousand in Romania, Bulgaria, and other places. Those who have emigrated or sought refuge in the United States and Canada, simply by virtue of distance, are probably less likely to return. Those who are closer are more likely to return. And of course, as we know, there have been incidents, especially in Germany, of violence against Ukrainians.
Again, I have no idea how the local Ukrainian communities have responded to this, but I can’t imagine they’re seeing it with any degree of glee. Quite the opposite. It seems to be a sign that sooner or later, they’re probably better off going home. That said, as you say, there will be a demographic problem that will have an impact on the social structure, the demographic structure, and questions of national identity.
On one hand, the war has certainly generated stronger feelings of identity. Wars do that. You’re forced to choose. You can’t just sit on the fence and say, «Well, whatever.» You’re either with us or against us. The vast majority of Ukraine’s inhabitants have joined the Ukrainian side, and that’s obviously encouraging. At the same time, it’s the patriots, first and foremost, who are being killed.
Brian Bonner: I agree completely. Ukraine would have straightened out its problems if Russia would have just left it alone. It never seems to want to do that. Ukraine deserves support, and for a lot of reasons, even if only one of them is that they surrendered their nuclear weapons for the Budapest Memorandum, which so far has proved worthless. But I agree with you. I’ve taken up a lot of your time. Do you think there’s room for more black swan events?
I’ve read some military analysts saying this is not the last incursion or the last surprise. What do you think?
Alexander Motyl: Well, you know, as someone who experienced the collapse of the Soviet Union, albeit from afar—something that was barely imaginable in the 1980s—and then as someone who experienced this war (which I did not foresee, by the way), I’m a firm believer in black swans. I also think they’re far more likely than is often assumed.
And my proof for that, by the way, is one of these village reconstructions west of Kyiv, about 10 or 20 miles out, where they have typical houses from all of Ukraine’s oblasts. I was there about five, six, seven years ago, and I encountered two black swans swimming lazily in one of the ponds. That persuaded me that black swans are an everyday phenomenon—or at least have the potential to be everyday phenomena.
Anyway, I’m joking. But the bottom line is, just as this special military operation surprised everyone, so did the ease with which Ukraine has been able to move and advance. All of that, along with Ukraine recapturing Kharkiv and Kherson without much resistance and the initiation of the war by Putin in February 2022, are effectively black swans.
So the notion that these events are rare and only occur once every couple of hundred years is fundamentally false. We’ve witnessed a series of surprising events with significant, if not earth-shattering, importance. Therefore, I’m personally convinced that this is far from the last incursion or surprise we’ll encounter in this war. My personal guess is that one of the next black swans will be Putin’s departure, either due to natural causes or the intervention of some of his comrades who decide he’s just gotta go. I’m betting on that particular black swan.